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
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Senator Tommaso TITTONI
Formerly Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs
and Italian Ambassador to Paris

Who was responsible for the war?

THE VERDICT OF HISTORY

Preface by NELSON GAY

BLOUD & GAY
ÉDITEURS

PARIS
3, Rue Garancière

BARCELONE
Calle del Bruch, 35

1918

Tous droits réservés

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

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ANGELICO

PREFACE

« I honour and respect England », declared Italy's master-statesman, Cavour, in 1859, « I hold her in veneration, because I look upon her as the rock upon which liberty found, and should occasion require, will again find, an invulnerable stronghold. I have always favoured all steps possible towards an alliance with England ; I have done this both as a writer and as minister and have followed this policy so earnestly as to have often incurred the reproach of being excessively Anglophile. »

« In the great battle which is being fought in all parts of the world between good and evil, between justice and oppression, between equality and privilege, between truth and falsehood, your place has already been assigned », wrote the great Italian apostle of nationality and political liberty, Mazzini, in his ardent appeal to the American people in 1865. « Workers for human-

ity, you cannot fail to realize that it would be a crime to stand aloof ; that indifference, when humanity calls, would be atheism... The map of Europe must be recast. Old states will disappear and young nations will spring to life ; these new nations will remember with especial ties of gratitude the help which America may render in their hour of trial. »

With these unequivocal declarations two of the « Makers » of Modern Italy affirmed more than a half-century ago, their immovable faith in the political virtue of the Anglo-Saxon, and by implication clearly indicated the position which Italy herself, possessing the same high political principles and identical civic ideals, was destined to occupy in the future struggles of the world, in the cause of international justice and liberty of the peoples.

Modern Italy is a young nation, the Benjamin of the Great Powers, but Modern Italy is by no means a new-comer among champions of the principles of national independence and popular government. The cradle of constitutional liberty in Italy was the Kingdom of Sardinia— from which the present Kingdom of Italy has been derived by successive annexations ; in 1851

the American chargé d'affaires resident at Turin, in an unpublished despatch to his government at Washington, justly characterized the little state of Sardinia as « in truth the only home of civil and religious liberty in Southern Europe ». In the mouth of the judicious representative from the great home of liberty in the Western Hemisphere, this is precious testimony upon Modern Italy's position as a pioneer in constitutional government ; and it fully bears out Cavour's affirmation of this same year : « We Sardinians are a small people when judged by our physical strength and our geographical extension, but we are at this moment a great people, because we are perhaps the people which represents most faithfully the idea of progress and of moderate liberty ; and I tell you that this idea is destined to spread and to extend over the whole of Europe. »

Cavour's words were prophetic. In the last half of the nineteenth century constitutional government did, indeed, spread throughout Europe. And its extension was due in no small degree to the effect of example, to the reaction upon retrograde European states of the liberal governments established in England, in the United States and in Italy.

The Alliance between England, Italy and the

United States in 1917 for combined military action in defence of international law and of liberty, is then in reality, only the manifestation in concrete form, of an uninterrupted Alliance of political and social ideals which has bound the three countries together for more than a half-century. Each country in carrying out its high mission today, is only carrying on the traditions of a half-century and more of its own individual history; intervention in the great war alike for Italy and for her two Anglo-Saxon sister states, has been the fulfilment of a destiny which had long been prepared.

But the circumstances of Italy's intervention were different from any which attended the intervention of her allies; and these circumstances are little known even to the Allies themselves. Furthermore, the Central Empires have done their best to distort evidence regarding the origin of the war and to falsify records of the international crises which preceded. It is necessary that the truth be re-established, and that German and Austrian acts of international injustice and brutal arrogance, which characterized the years prior to the outbreak of the war, should be frankly disclosed, if a just conception is to be formed of the policy which brought Italy

logically and inevitably to a rupture with the Central Empires, and which led her, on May 24th. 1915, in the fulfilment of her destiny, to occupy her place as a hereditary champion of « civilization and justice ».

Upon Italian foreign affairs during the decade which preceded the war, Senator Tittoni is without question the highest authority. From 1903 to 1909, excepting brief intervals, he was Italian Secretary for Foreign Affairs, and from 1910 to 1916, he was Italian Ambassador to France ; during his ambassadorship in Paris Senator Tittoni continued to exert a large influence upon Italy's general international policy, and in all critical moments prior to the war his counsel was sought by his successor at the Consulta, Marquis San Giuliano. He is the Italian best fitted to speak upon the origin of the great war, and his volume: *Who was responsible for the war ? The verdict of history,* which is published for the enlightenment of contemporaries, will always remain a primary source for the historian.

In the following pages Senator Tittoni speaks frequently in the first person ; he gives us vivid glimpses of the international European crises of recent years as viewed from behind the scenes

of diplomatic negotiation ; and under authorization from the Italian Foreign Office he makes grave diplomatic revelations. Italy's foreign policy as carried on during the six years of his ministry is summarized in a few words : « We held to the Triple Alliance because it seemed to us to be a sure guarantee of peace, and because it did not prevent us from cultivating cordial and friendly relations with England and France. » The Central Empires themselves recognized the fact that Italy's continued participation in the Triple Alliance was inspired primarily by the desire that the peace of Europe be maintained, and that if any attempt were made to use the Alliance to carry out a policy of international aggression, the Alliance itself would be destroyed. One of the main purposes of the Alliance was the maintenance of the *statu quo* in the Balkans, and the famous Seventh Article of the secret Treaty expressly provided that any change which might become unavoidable there, should be effected only after a mutual agreement had been arrived at between Austria and Italy. The two unpublished telegrams exchanged between Marquis San Giuliano and Senator Tittoni on April 30th. 1913, which were first made public in the latter's address at the

Trocadero in June 1915, throw further light upon this portion of the Treaty and prove that its provisions regarding the Adriatic were clearly understood at Vienna and Berlin : « Any disturbance of the Italo-Austrian equilibrium would affect not only Article 7, but the whole Treaty of Alliance. On the day on which Austria should pretend to disturb in any way or measure the equilibrium of the Adriatic, the Triple Alliance would cease to exist. »

But in the eyes of Austria-Hungary and Germany the Seventh Article was a mere « scrap of paper » which could not be allowed in any way to interfere with the subjugation of Servia, any more than a similar « scrap of paper » has been allowed to interfere with the invasion of Belgium. Austria's iniquitous repudiation of her solemn engagements in the Triple Alliance and her shameless betrayal of Italy in July 1914, are set forth with much force and with irrefutable logic by Senator Tittoni. Germany's cynicism, brutality and bad faith in international affairs of the past decade are similarly dealt with. The writer places in especial relief von Jagow's declaration that the assassination at Sarajevo was merely a *pretext* for the great war—not the cause. He quotes freely from German and Aus-

trian sources, condemning these governments out of their own mouths, and his acts of condemnation bear the stamp of finality.

The pages which deal with the crisis of 1909 apropos of Bosnia-Herzegovina are also of great importance, showing that then, as in 1914, Italy and England worked loyally, shoulder to shoulder, for the preservation of European peace.

We may be certain that immediately after the war there will be a great Austro-German mobilization of sophisms and falsified documents to prove the innocence of the Central Empires and to throw the responsibility for the war upon others. Too much importance cannot be given to such volumes as this by Senator Tittoni, if the historian of the future is to be found in a state of preparedness for this imminent Austro-German campaign of falsification.

Senator Tittoni's last word is « Redemption ». More than once in the course of his volume he has called attention to Austria-Hungary's want of foresight in provoking the great war : « She did not consider that by imprudently dragging Europe into a fearful conflagration, causing thereby endless ruin and the shedding of the blood of a whole generation, she necessarily raised on all sides the great problem of oppress-

ed nationalities, which the universal desire for the preservation of peace had deliberately caused to be put aside for so many years. She failed to understand that this problem, when once raised, allowed of but one fatal, inevitable solution : « Redemption. » The country most interested in establishing a peace solidly based upon the principles of nationality and international justice, is Italy. The wars of 1859 and 1866 freed the Lombardo-Veneto from Austrian domination and oppression, but the inhabitants of twenty thousand square kilometres of geographical Italy remained, and remain today, excluded from the Italian nation. These unredeemed provinces are not only geographically Italian because they shed their waters into the Adriatic and offer with their mountain barriers a defensible military frontier to Italy, but they are Italian by race, language, history, art, traditions, and sentiment—and they have remained Italian in spite of the most abominable refinements of Austrian cunning and cruelty to denationalize and Teutonize them (1). These unre-

(1) In these last years, realizing the impossibility of Germanizing her Italian subjects, Austria has changed her policy and has attempted to supplant them and crush their nationality by inviting into their provinces and in every way favouring the Jugo-Slavs.

deemed Italian provinces will be the first to profit by the solution of the great international question of oppressed nationalities. For them the great war marks the last hour of their long and terrible martyrdom. For them this is indeed, a war of « Redemption ».

Rome, August 1917.

H. Nelson Gay.

ADDRESS

delivered in Paris at the Trocadero on June 24th. 1915.

LADIES AND GENTLEMEN—

Before coming here I received a communication couched in the following terms : *The Leonardo da Vinci, an Italian Society for Mutual Aid and Instruction, wishes to declare publicly in common with the great majority of Italian Societies in Paris, that silence and reflection are imposed upon us while the cannon speak and our brothers are fighting ; this is the most fitting way of making preparation to honour the fallen and the heroes in the day of final victory..*

War is a serious matter

This statement I heartily endorse : the present war is indeed a serious matter, most serious, and it must be faced in a serious way by every nation. Let us avoid demonstrations, noisy crowds, the harangues of improvised speech makers, exaggeration in the newspapers over every little success; and at the same time let there be no panic or agitation over

any loss, but a quiet resolute bearing, orderly and steadfastly calm. Such has been the bearing of the French nation since the beginning of the war, and this constitutes one of its highest titles to universal admiration.

To-day public attention is turned not towards the speaker but towards the soldier. The figure of Tyrtaeus stands forth in history because he was both poet and soldier. A Tyrtaeus who, in the day of battle, had not been seen in the thick of the fray, and who had had no glorious wounds to show, would have awakened but scanty interest and would soon have been forgotten.

For this reason I did not expect to be called upon to speak to-day. But since you, Mr. President, distinguished head of the French Chamber of Deputies, in addition to honouring this meeting by your presence, have chosen also to pronounce an eloquent discourse rendering noble homage to Italy, it has been impossible for me to remain silent and as one of this select and numerous audience only enjoy the pleasure and fascination of your address. It is fitting, it is right that after you, I should rise with the like purpose of rendering homage to you and to France. You had already spoken nobly and eloquently of Italy in that solemn session of the Chamber in which all the members, having risen, turned towards the diplomatic tribune where I was seated and enthusiastically acclaimed Italy in the person of her representative. This demonstration was repeated shortly afterward at the Senate during the special session held by that High Assembly in hon-

our of Italy. Constitutionally I was obliged to figure then as a simple spectator and to remain silent in face of those never to be forgotten manifestations of sympathy ; but to-day as I have the pleasure of being among you, I wish to testify to the emotion that I then felt and which contrary to my inclination I was forced to restrain and repress.

Italian policy

Mr President ! You have spoken of my country with affection, you have paid a high tribute to her King, you have praised the work of those who govern her. Your inspired words will meet with the same lively sympathy in the hearts of all Italians which they now inspire in mine. You have expressed synthetically in a few words your appreciation of the spirit and purpose shown by me in handling the affairs of the Triple Alliance during the years in which I had the direction of Italian foreign policy, a purpose, indeed, which had no secret ends to conceal, and which was openly revealed to all by my repeated and explicit declarations to the Italian parliament. Your appreciation is so just that I have nothing to add to it.

I will only refer briefly to the events of the present day in order to demonstrate that Italian policy keeps to the same aims which it has always cherished, and preserves the same coherence and clearness that has distinguished it in the past. Already the Secretary for Foreign Affairs, the Hon. Sonnino in his note to the Powers, which was a most convinc-

ing affirmation of our right, and the President of the Council, the Hon. Salandra in his high-minded speech at the Capitol which found an echo throughout the whole civilized world, have shown how the aggression prepared and perpetrated by Austria against Servia without our knowledge, was a flagrant offence against both the spirit and letter of the Alliance. After such an aggression, indeed, one may say that nothing whatever remained of the Alliance itself.

An attempt has been made to divert attention from the real causes of the present war, by stating that it was inevitable, owing to the commercial competition between Germany and England in every market of the world. But this is one of those commonplaces that one hears repeated on all sides, but of which no one is capable of giving the demonstration. If this were true, since competition between nations in the industrial and commercial field is an essential element in the world's progress, and a necessary condition of the existence and development of nations themselves, one would be forced to the conclusion that it is impossible for nations to live and to develop in peace, and that war is a normal condition, the necessary instrument of their evolution.

And this would be nothing less than blasphemy.

Besides, against such an affirmation stands the fact, that at the time of the declaration of the war Germany had found a basis of agreement on every question of a politico-economic nature which had arisen between herself and rival powers. She had come to an agreement with France about Morocco ;

with Russia about the Persian railways ; with England about the Bagdad railway and those of Asia Minor—to which latter agreement the adhesion of Turkey only was wanting. So by a strange contradiction, by a cruel irony, war broke out not while conflicts between divers interests were causing tension between Germany and other nations, but only after all questions which might have provoked a conflict had been peaceably settled. War therefore was useless, absurd, unjust.

Who provoked the European war?

No, it is not economic rivalry that provokes war between nations. Too often it is caprice, pride, inordinate desire of supremacy and empire, scorn of treaties, contempt for the principle of nationality, the insolence of big states towards small ones which, if justice exists at all, have the same right to respect for their independence and integrity as their more powerful neighbours.

I have read the following phrase in several official German declarations : *This war which we did not want and which has been imposed upon us.* But imposed by whom, in what way, when ? In the German Imperial message it was stated that Germany had been forced to declare war in order not to forsake her ally, Austria. Therefore one tyrannical act alone unchained war, and this was Austria's unqualifiable attempt to coerce and oppress Servia. The Hungarian Prime Minister, Count Tisza whose

energetic personality has eclipsed the fading figure of Count Berchtold who has disappeared from the international stage like a phantom, invoked in one of his speeches a curse on the head of the man who had provoked war. Had he no suspicion at that moment that his invocation might draw down the thunderbolt of divine justice on his own head ?

The *ultimatum* was presented to Servia by Austria with such arrogance and such absolute disregard of form that I could not help saying to Count Szecsen when he left Paris, that it seemed to me that Austria was not satisfied with merely being in the wrong, but that she wished her injustice to appear as grave as possible in the eyes of the whole world.

The *ultimatum* was considered by Italy to be hurtful to Italian interests and contrary to the agreement of Alliance. Austria professed great astonishment at this. But to justify this astonishment, it would be necessary to give to that cutting sentence of the Hon. Salandra about the mediocrity of the statesmen on whose shoulders hangs the responsability of the most terrible war that the world has ever seen, an extension far beyond that intended by him. One should read over again all the declarations of the men who succeeded each other in the direction of foreign policy in Italy, and it will be found that they, one and all, during a long series of years continued to affirm that the only reason for Italy's being in the Triple Alliance was the preservation of European peace and the balance of power between Italy and Austria in the Adriatic.

As for me, on my first appearance in the Italian parliament as Secretary for Foreign Affairs, I took the opportunity of stating that we held to the Triple Alliance because it seemed to us to be a sure guarantee of peace and because it did not prevent us from cultivating cordial and friendly relations with England and France.

The Triple Alliance and Italy

In the last political speech which I delivered before giving up office, I expressed myself in almost identical terms. This indicates the continuity and coherence that Italian policy has always shown. As regards the Balkan questions, did I not publicly affirm after the conference at Abbazia with Count Goluchowski, that they should be settled on the basis of the principle of nationality? Had not Baron d'Aehrenthal by his renunciation to that right of garrison in the Sangiaccato which was sanctioned by Art. 65 of the Treaty of Berlin, a renunciation which was the price of the annexation of Bosnia-Herzegovina and without which the first Balkan war would have been impossible, had he not by this I say, implicitly and by the logical sequence of things, given up the programme of Austria's further expansion eastward? Furthermore in the communication given to the press after the convention of Racconigi between the Czar and the King of Italy, did I not state that Russia and Italy were agreed in favouring the free development of the Balkan States and that

such was also the understanding between Austria and Italy ?

The attitude of Italy towards the Balkan States has never changed ; and to-day while jealousies and rivalries continue among them, causing them to shut their eyes to their true interests, the words to which I gave utterance at the Italian Chamber in 1908 still have the ring of actuality : « The action of Italy aims at the well-being of the Slavs, the Greeks, the Roumanians, and of all the nationalities intermingled in the Balkan peninsula.

We are distressed only at their bitter struggles ; and we have but one desire, that of seeing peace established among them and of witnessing their development. »

Precedents in Italo-Austrian relations

The Hon. Salandra in his speech has clearly stated that from July 25th. 1914, that is as soon as the Austrian ultimatum was known, Marquis San Giuliano declared to Austria that she had no right to present the ultimatum without a previous agreement with her allies. But, if a Green Book were published which went back at least to the beginning of the first Balkan war, it would be seen that every time that Austria tried to carry out any isolated action in the Balkan States, warnings and admonitions have not been wanting on Italy's side.

The Hon. Giolitti has already opportunely notified the Italian Chamber that a year before the war

Italy received notice of Austrian proposals of aggression against Servia and decisively refused her consent to them.

However, previous to that time there are most important precedents, among which for the sake of brevity I will choose two only. After the victory of the allied states in the first Balkan war against Turkey, Austria understood that it was impossible to offer any opposition to the expansion of the Balkan States. Consequently in November 1912, she turned to Italy and asked for her agreement to the Austrian programme which allowed the expansion of Servia on the condition of certain Servian guarantees to Austria. Italy in promising assent expressly declared that she gave it upon the condition that the said guarantees should not constitute a monopoly to the exclusive benefit of Austria and should not prejudice the independence of Servia. Austria undertook to study these guarantees and to communicate them to us, but this communication was never made—perhaps because the purpose of aggression was ripening and was gradually being substituted for this peaceable proposal. It is known to very few that a few months after this, Austria by threatening to occupy Montenegro, was on the point of creating a situation between herself and Italy similar to that created later on by the aggression against Servia.

Austria wished to occupy Montenegro

I may speak of this with the permission of the Secretary for Foreign Affairs as it relates to a period which, although of recent date, now belongs to history. On the 13th. of April 1913, when the powers had not yet decided on the international occupation of Scutari, Marquis San Giuliano sent to me the following telegram : *If the decision of the conference of the Ambassadors, which no one can foretell, does not satisfy Austria-Hungary, if an agreement for Italo-Austrian action be impossible, and if Austria takes action against Montenegro without first securing our approval, a most delicate situation will be created, and it will be difficult to maintain the Italo-Austrian agreement and the cohesion of the Alliance. I beg your Excellency to wire me at once your authoritative opinion as to our course of action. Italy must not appear to be inert, but while Austria is acting in the north of the Adriatic, we should be acting in the south, and make a temporary landing in a suitable spot ; and such an operation should be considered as carried out by Italy under approximately the same conditions as those under which Austria-Hungary acts. Excluding this solution I see only a situation in which we should be compelled to follow a policy in direct opposition to that of Austria.*

« *Signed :* San Giuliano. »

I answered Marquis San Giuliano's telegram im-

mediately in the following terms : *If Austria wishes to occupy Montenegro wholly or in part, we shall be obliged to go to Durazzo and Vallona even without her consent. In fact Austria by the occupation of Montenegro would be making a move which is quite unnecessary for the carrying out of the decision of the Powers as regards Scutari ; hence she would be the first to exceed and violate the wishes of the Powers by acting on her own account when there was no necessity for such action, and thereby disturbing the equilibrium of the Adriatic in a way prejudicial to us ; for even a temporary occupation would disturb this equilibrium. Nor is any value to be attributed to the sophistries to which the Austrian and German Ambassadors have recourse by keeping merely to the letter of Art. 7 of the Treaty of the Triple Alliance. The spirit of that article is clear ; furthermore any disturbance of the Italo-Austrian equilibrium would affect not only Art. 7 but the whole Treaty of Alliance. The day on which Austria should pretend to disturb in any way or measure the equilibrium of the Adriatic the Triple Alliance would cease to exist. I feel sure that this latter consideration placed by your Excellency with your usual clearness and firmness before the German and Austrian Secretaries of Foreign Affairs, will convince them that they will have to take into account the vital interests of Italy, and it should facilitate the task which is incumbent on Your Excellency of reconciling these interests with those of Austria ; otherwise the Treaty of the Triple Alliance will be broken by their action. This after due con-*

sideration is my answer to your Excellency's request for an opinion.

Signed : TITTONI.

From this it will be seen that what was wanting was not warning on our side, but lack of good-will on Austria's side.

" Not a peace, but the peace ! "

Moreover Austria-Hungary showed great want of foresight. She did not consider that by imprudently dragging Europe into a fearful conflagration, causing thereby endless ruin and the shedding of the blood of a whole generation, she necessarily raised on all sides the great problem of oppressed nationalities, which the universal desire for the preservation of peace had deliberately caused to be put aside for so many years. She failed to understand that this problem, when once raised, would allow of but one, fatal, inevitable solution : Redemption.

And here I find that I have gone beyond the limits allowed in a speech, and indeed I am partially to blame for this in having taken up a question, the proper handling of which would require a whole book. Perhaps you in your fervent patriotism will have felt some disappointment because my words have not seemed sufficiently fervid and impassioned. But we are in a historic period and I have spoken of facts which will be recorded and judged by

history. It became me therefore to check fervour of sentiment and hold strictly to the serenity and impartiality of the historian.

I will conclude my discourse by sending a hearty message of greeting to all our soldiers, on this day which calls to mind a deed of arms glorious for both France and Italy ; and I sincerely join in your desire, Mr. President, that peace obtained through victory shall bring not merely peace, but *the Peace* uninfected by any germs of possible future wars, *the Peace* solidly established on principles of nationality and international justice.

CONCLUSION OF AN ADDRESS

delivered at the Provincial Council of Rome on January 16th. 1916.

The death of the celebrated Doctor Broussais and of other distinguished men in the year 1836, gave occasion to Guizot to make the following observation :

I have always felt, even before reaching old age, an affectionate respect for the dead ; the many and various ways in which death strikes without warning always come to my mind in the presence of those who are leading the most exsuberant and happy lives ; those who mourn for a long time inspire my sympathy, while the readiness of others to forget the dead fills me with compassion for those who have so soon passed out of lives in which they thought that they held a foremost place.

I imagine that these are sentiments which we all feel before an open tomb. Certainly Guido Baccelli is not among those whose lot it is to be readily forgotten, but among those who leave behind them lasting regret. However I cannot refrain from telling to you one of my impressions.

I do not know if you have ever observed the same phenomenon in your mind that I have in mine. This gigantic war, which leaves such deep traces of ruin and mourning in its trail, has turned the com-

plex and powerful economic organism of the whole of Europe upside down, has trampled upon every principle of justice, right and humanity which seemed to have become at length the heritage of modern civilization. Since this war has broken out, the death of distinguished men or of very dear friends leaves us with a certain sense of indifference, and we seem incapable of dedicating to them the same affectionate regret, that we should have given them in normal times. Why is this? It is because all our wealth of affection and remembrance, all our heart beatings, all our deepest fellings reach out to our brave boys who on the summits of the Alps, on the banks of the Isonzo, on the shores of the Adriatic, among the dangers of the aerial regions or in the depths of the seas, proudly offer their lives in sacrifice to their country. To the King, to our soldiers and sailors, to those who dying gave life to their native land, to the wounded burning with desire to return to the scene of combat, to those who at this moment are fighting heroically, we send our plaudits, our admiration, our gratitude, our greetings and our heart-felt good wishes. Honour to you, race of heroes, flower of Latin blood. Through you may the honour and valour of Italy shine forth throughout the whole world.

ADDRESS

delivered in the great hall of the Municipal Palace at Nice on February 20th. 1916.

Mr. Mayor Gentlemen—

I thank you, Mr. Mayor, for the kind words which you have addressed to me. The cordial reception which I have received here, the high tribute which you have paid to Italy, the sentiments of fraternity and solidarity to which I have listened from your lips, would have filled me with delight, were it not that for the present it is our duty to check all feelings of joy, reserving the manifestation of it for the hour of final victory.

Therefore to-day let us not be glad, but calm, confident, virile, and steadfast in our endeavours, with our thoughts continually turned towards those who are fighting and dying for their country.

The soldiers who on our frontiers are daily showing marvels of heroism, know that the hearts of two whole nations beat for them, and them only. For this reason too, even fêtes promoted in the sacred cause of rendering aid in the prosecution of the war, should bear as do these of Nice, some semblance of gravity, because so long as this cruel war lasts our life should be more austere than in normal

times. I said as long as the war lasts, but why not afterwards too ? If now, while the future of the country is at stake, each of us should vie with the other in abnegation and in the spirit of sacrifice, it is also true that these virtues will be needed none the less after peace has been signed.

For only at the cost of abnegation and sacrifice can we hope to repair the enormous breaches made in national finance, readjust economic organization, satisfy the manifold demands of civil progress and preserve social peace.

Besides, I believe that the generation that has taken part in this war which, while it has scattered material ruin far and wide, has elevated the soul, refined the spirit, and tempered character, will preserve even after the war a higher sense of dignity, seriousness, self-respect and devotion to country.

Do not be surprised that I should speak to you of after the war, while present-day questions are weighing so heavily upon us. I do so because I think that the vigilant, unceasing care in the preparation for victory, can allow the minds of statesmen to look also to more distant ends ; and this in my opinion is of special importance as regards France and Italy.

To everything which is likely to unite the two countries, sentiments, like-feelings, memories, sympathies, there is added once more fraternity in arms ; and without any doubt blood shed on battlefields in the same cause is a powerful cement in binding together two nations.

In order to render such a union lasting, peoples must always be conscious of their common cause.

It is only natural that the interests of two great nations bordering on each other not only in their national territory, but in their colonies too, should sometimes have divergent interests. Just because of this the shrewdness and clear-sightedness of statesmen should be shown by conciliating these interests in time. Interests of commerce, industry, finance, colonies, labour and labourer should form a subject for special agreement, which should survive the war and be a sure pledge of concord and union, because the coexistence of a political alliance and economic barriers is inconceivable.

Distinguished French and Italian parliamentarians of universally acknowledged competence and authority have already met together at Cernobbio and will meet again in Paris, to collaborate in this patriotic work.

Let us make them welcome ! Their co-operation cannot but the more assure the favourable vote of the legislative assemblies of the two nations.

May this be the useful complement to the work of Briand, President of the Council, who during this visit to Italy succeeded, amid popular acclamations, in obtaining during his interviews with the Hon. Salandra and the Hon. Sonnino, unity in the direction of the diplomatic and military affairs of the allies.

You, Mr. Mayor, have spoken of the affectionate welcome given to Italian workmen both by officials and private citizens in Nice, and throughout the province.

For this I thank you heartily. I do not know

whether you realize that by so doing you have touched the most sensitive chords of the Italian heart. The Italian nation follows with solicitude her workmen, who take the wealth of their industry and sobriety into foreign lands. They are her best blood. Those who receive them and treat them as brothers may be certain of winning the sympathy and gratitude of the Italian people.

A labour treaty between France and Italy is already in existence and I feel honoured that my name should figure there by the side of that of the Hon. Luzzatti. I trust that a second treaty may complete this, establishing perfect reciprocity and equality for aid and social protection of Italian and French workmen in France and in Italy.

Mr. Mayor, Gentlemen !

Speaking in the Italian Chamber in the year 1906, I said : *Who would dare to face the terrible consequences of a war between the great European Powers, without a sentiment of horror ? Who without suffering eternal remorse would lightly venture to expose his own country to an unnecessary war ?*

If unhappily war were to break out between the great Powers, in my opinion the consequences could be summed up in one phrase : the bankruptcy of Europe.

However, this unnecessary war has broken out. I will not go back to the question of responsibilities, which by this time have been clearly and decisively established.

As one of your most distinguished orators has said,

the assassination of Sarajevo, which was an individual crime, did not give Austria the right to reply with the scandalous *ultimatum* to Servia which was a collective crime.

This war is a stain on civilization which can be blotted out in only one way, by a peace that will re-establish justice and right and secure humanity, if not for ever, at least for a very long time from repetitions of similar catastrophies. This is the peace which we invoke and for which we fight, nor shall we lay down our arms until it be obtained.

ADDRESS

delivered in Paris at the meeting of the Franco-Italian League in honour of the Deputies of the Italian Parliament on the evening of April 29th. 1916.

Honoured President and very dear Friend—

As all, or nearly all the members of the Franco-Italian League, which has contributed so effectively, first to the better understanding and then to the friendship between our countries and to which you have devoted all the energy of a fervent patriot, are familiar with the language of Dante, allow me to address you this time in my native tongue ; heretofore I have spoken to you so often in your own beautiful language which I have always considered peculiarly adapted for the expression of the most subtle shades of thought and sentiment. When you invited me to speak, and to join you at table, I confess to having felt some reluctance ; for never as in these tragic times in which we live so intensely, has it been necessary that speech give place to action, and that he who undertakes to speak should do so only if he be able to reveal something new to the public, or to bring some new contribution to the cause for which we are fighting together.

Thanks to the happy initiative of the French government we have had the political and military conference of the allied governments in Paris, and we shall soon have the economic conference. The present meeting, and another which will shortly take place, both honoured by the presence of many distinguished men, will be a useful preparation for the economic conference. Now it is only natural that public opinion should expect to learn from speakers who either have taken, or are going to take, part in these political, military and economic discussions, what practical and concrete results have been achieved, especially in the vital questions of the present moment—namely those regarding transport, freight charges, rates of exchange and munitions. And public opinion is right, for a transport crisis may paralyze the economic life of a country, and freight charges as well as rates of exchange are to nations what blood is to the human body ; when the former run too high, or the temperature of the latter rises too much, the social body and the human body are ill.

The question of ammunition in common with all military and economic questions in this gigantic war has assumed vast proportions that have never before been seen or imagined. France by a miraculous effort has managed to wholly solve it ; in every other country men are working feverishly upon it. And yet this febrility of work is not sufficient ; it must be intensified, redoubled, for unless we have ammunition in such quantities as to enable our artillery to keep on firing without ever

being stopped by the fear of running out of shells, the heroism of our soldiers and the skill of our generals will avail nothing.

Perhaps you will tell me, my dear President, that while waiting for responsible men in office to speak of these questions in precise terms at the time they may think most opportune, there are however other subjects upon which I might speak : the defence and reconstruction of the smaller states which have undergone martyrdom and lost all, or nearly all, of their territory ; the vindication and triumph of the principle of nationality ; the reintregration of justice and of international law.

I am sure we are all faithful to these high ideals which constitute the « raison d'être » of our war and give it that moral character of which we are justly proud. In my opinion, however, these ideals, if their attraction and prestige is to be preserved, should be proclaimed from high tribunes and only on solemn occasions. In order to preserve their full strength and virtue, they should penetrate the soul of peoples as a cult, as a religion. They should be popular, but as a sublime hymn whose divine harmony every one feels, and not as a popular song of the day. Let us then cultivate these ideals with affection, but let our expression of them be dignified and sober that it may be the more worthy.

I find now that in explaining my reasons for not wishing to speak, I have ended by speaking too much. In spite of this I have still one thing more to say. I spoke of my reluctance to join you at table. The same reluctance was already shown by

the Hon. Luzzatti in a telegram addressed to you in the name of the Italian Parliament. I must therefore tell you how our reluctance was overcome. A banquet generally gives one the idea of gaiety and thoughtlessness. We have met together here with all the gravity, the seriousness, the austerity, the reflection that the present time demands, and on our minds are impressed the same sentiments as those with which, as Diodorus Siculus relates, Leonidas and his men sat down to table on the night before the battle of Thermopylae. You at any rate, my dear President, who live in the city of Paris which has given and still gives such a splendid example of gravity, seriousness, austerity and reflection, you could never have thought of calling us together for amusement and gaiety, but you desired to have us with you to affirm once more our unshaken faith and our virile determination. This we wish the heroes who are fighting in the trenches to know. Each one of us, doing his duty at the post assigned to him, aims at the coveted prize of being considered worthy of them. We wish them to know that we are living and that our hearts palpitate for them alone, and that whole nations are intertwining laurel wreaths for those who return with the emblems of victory, and are preparing apotheoses for those who have gloriously fallen on the field of honour. Never shall forgetfulness distend her veil over them, never for them shall the epigraph of Chateaubriand on the death of Marshal Lannes be repeated : *Affection for men cools as rapidly as the bullet that strikes them.*

I have with my usual frankness placed before you my way of thinking. It is shared by all my honoured colleagues of the Italian Parliament, who have come here under the high and authoritative leadership of the Hon. Luigi Luzzatti. Among them you see represented fraternally and patriotically various political parties, and all the provinces of Italy. This shows you that in common with France we have effected a sacred union and that one thought only dominates every mind—our country, her future, her greatness, her glory !

ADDRESS

delivered in Paris
in the great hall at the Sorbonne
on June 22nd. 1916.

LADIES AND GENTLEMEN—

For the second time I have the honour of addressing you in this hall, where the splendid traditions of literature, philosophy and science surround the speaker, and inspire him with dignity and nobility of thought. On the former occasion a public, frank and loyal explanation between the President of the Council, M. Poincaré, and myself, put an end to a misunderstanding which had arisen between France and Italy. I remind you of this incident, which now seems to us like a distant haze, only because I think that it cannot but strengthen the resolute will of the two nations, that no further misunderstanding shall arise and that a friendship rendered strong by sympathy, confidence, respect and protection of mutual interests, shall endure forever between them. At that time M. Poincaré spoke of a passing cloud. We do not want clouds, however, not even passing ones ; we want a radiant, calm, cloudless sky extending always over France and Italy.

Our new duties

At that time we had no thought of war, and we have been reproached for not having then foreseen it. There is no foundation for this reproach ; a necessary war may be foreseen ; a useless war cannot be foreseen ; everything in fact may be foreseen, except the ways of human madness.

As M. Poincaré spoke four years ago, so might Anatole France and Barthou have spoken to-day and tasted the pure delight which an orator experiences when he succeeds in holding the attention of his listeners, and tunes their souls to vibrate in unison with his own ; and the public might have again enjoyed the satisfaction of listening to noble thoughts nobly expressed. But to-day these purely intellectual and aesthetic pleasures have become foreign to us. We have graver cares, sterner duties and a great goal to reach, and to this we are wholly dedicated.

And the goal demands of us not appearances, but reality. Speculation has to give way to action. We should recall the teaching of ancient wisdom : *Facere docet philosophia, non dicere.* Therefore let us not waste time in useless speeches, in banalities and vain words, in empty rhetoric which, by creating a phantasm of illusions, may take our minds even for an instant from disciplined action ; for whether our office be high or low, and the post we occupy conspicuous or modest, it is only by disciplined action that we shall be able to work effi-

ciently, and contribute, to the utmost limits of our means and power, to the realization of our supreme end—the victory of the common cause !

To-day, when an orator begins to speak, his audience, before considering whether his speech be brilliant or feeble, asks rather : What has he done for his country in this supreme hour ? I think I am right in saying that if Louis Barthou has left such a deep impression upon you and has so profoundly moved your hearts to-day, it is not only due to the charm and force of his marvellous eloquence, but it is due even more to the fact that he has given more than his life for his country ; he has given another life a hundred times dearer to him than his own. His voice had a tragic accent, because it bore unmistakable traces of the two great tragedies that are stirring his soul—that of this terrible and bloody war, and the sacrifice of his dearest affection. Forgive me, dear friend Barthou, if I have reawakened your sorrow ; but your patriotic soul is ready also for this severe test. Moreover I do not think that your own sad memories were absent, when you concentrated in your impassioned avenging words the curses of all mourning families on those who, without any necessity or legitimate reason, have spread over Europe a scourge more terrible than all the combined ills to which humanity is heir.

The responsibility for the war

Those who must bear the responsibility try to remove this curse from their heads by repeating till one is nauseated, that they did not want the war. They say nothing but this and stick to it desperately, because it can bear no semblance of truth unless taken in a strictly literal sense. A distinguished French psychologist, in a book of recent date, although stigmatizing Austria and Germany, wrote that no one wished for this war, and that all feared it. It may be that Austria and Germany did not wish for a European war, or at least not such an extended war. It may be that Austria flattered herself that she could safely perpetrate the aggression against Servia, without danger that Russia would take up the insolent challenge, or that France would keep to her engagements with Russia, or that Italy would do anything to prevent the change in the balance of power in the Adriatic to her own disadvantage and the flagrant violation of the Treaty of Alliance—an Alliance which had been conceived as a means of legitimate defence of the balance of power and of peace, and which neither could nor ought to oblige her to become an accomplice in a criminal aggression, even by mere non-intervention.

It may be that Germany flattered herself that she could repeat a second time the order given to Petrograd in the year 1909, a few months after the annexation of Bosnia-Herzegovina, without reflecting that Russia, just because she had once tolerated it,

could not do so a second time without affirming her own decadence.

It may be even that Germany flattered herself that she could violate the neutrality of Belgium, without danger that England would feel the blow, and that she could crush the noble little nation without awakening the sympathy and indignation of the civilized world. Could these puerile illusions however, if indeed they were ever entertained, diminish the responsibility of those who were illuded ? Even if we admit that Austria and Germany could defend themselves against the accusation of having in cold blood premeditated war for which, from a military point of view, they alone were prepared as subsequent facts have already demonstrated, they would be equally culpable of having brought it about through recklessness, through pride, through contempt of international justice.

The Chancellor of the German Empire, in his speech delivered at the Reichstag about a fortnight ago, again denounced the mobilization of Russia as the real cause which provoked the war. We could answer that mobilization ordered by one Power, may give the other Powers the right to mobilize in their turn, but that war does not necessarily follow ; indeed, examples are not wanting in which mobilization has not interrupted diplomatic negotiations, and in which the latter have been followed by peaceful solutions. But even if we accept the principle enunciated by the German Chancellor, and ascribe the responsibility for the war to the country which was the first to mobilize, the condemnation of Aus-

tria is not avoided, as it was precisely she who was the first to mobilize.

It may be, however, that Austria had for a long time considered mobilization a normal precaution. She mobilized her army in 1908 and in 1909 during the whole of the Bosnia-Herzegovina crisis; she mobilized in 1913 during the Balkan and Albanian crises, but the other Powers neither lost their « sang-froid » nor looked upon war as a necessary consequence of mobilization.

Russia in 1913 only limited herself to retaining, as an innocent measure of precaution, one class under arms ; but as Count Berchtold stated so well in his speech to the Delegations of November 20th. 1913 (and I like to quote his actual words) : *An exchange of views due to the generous initiative of two sovereigns, succeeded in causing these measures to be abandoned before the crisis had been too far prolonged.* In this way Count Berchtold himself, took the trouble in 1913 of condemning his own mode of action in 1914, and of contradicting and confuting Bethmann-Hollweg, long before this latter thought of speaking.

Writers and philosophers of different nations have published learned dissertations, in which they enumerate a long and numerous series of moral, psychological, ethnical, economic and political causes, which, according to them, fatally led up to the war. I admire their ingenuity and their erudition, which I must confess has deceived a certain section of public opinion ; but I am altogether contrary to their thesis. As I think that I have already clearly demonstrated in my speech at the Trocadero, nei-

ther economic competition, nor the mainfold questions which had arisen between Germany and the other Powers, all of which had been already settled by special agreements, could constitute a motive or a reasonable pretext for the war.

The aggression against Servia

It is necessary to keep always in mind the true origin of the war—Austria's aggression against Servia. By introducing alien factors into the discussion, confusion has been created in the mind of the public and Austria and Germany are taking advantage of this confusion to shift the heavy and inconvenient responsibility which is weighing upon them. The subterfuge of their statesmen consists in taking no account of Austria's aggression against Servia, as if it were a perfectly natural and legitimate proceeding in which Europe had no right to interfere. We shall concentrate our attention upon this subterfuge, as it constitutes the corner-stone of the Austro-German thesis. If we destroy it, their whole thesis will crumble to dust.

Light has been thrown on the ten dramatic days which passed between the presentation of the *ultimatum* to Servia and the declaration of war, by the publication of documents on the part of all the interested states. These documents have been abundantly commented upon in the speeches of statesmen, in books, pamphlets and magazine and newspaper articles. I, myself had occasion to speak of

them at the Trocadero, adding an unpublished document to those already published. I will not insist any longer on this point, in order not to repeat what has already been stated by myself and by others. The brutal and insolent wording of the Austrian *ultimatum* unsupported by documents ; the contempt shown for Servia's humble and submissive answer ; the negative answer accorded to the request of the Powers for a brief prorogation ; the categorical refusal to examine the friendly, conciliatory and just proposals, which some of them had presented and others seconded in order to avoid war and give satisfaction to Austria, while preserving the independence of Servia and the supreme rights of justice ; all these facts have led public opinion throughout the world to pronounce a definitive sentence against Austria and Germany, a sentence against which there can be no appeal.

Although the events which took place between July 24th. and August 4th. have been clearly put in evidence, the antecedents of the Servian question have not been sufficiently made known. This should have been done before. I will try now to give you a rapid, sober and impartial synthesis of them, as it will still be of service.

Yes, above all impartial, since I am not addressing you in order to make a patriotic speech, but to bring a material contribution to truth and to history ; and in order that my argument may be able to resist all the sophisms of our enemies, I will base it upon one source only—the carefully prepared Austrian official declarations.

One of their statesmen has well understood that the defence of the Central Empires in the question of the *ultimatum* to Servia is both difficult and dangerous, and he has attempted their justification on other grounds. The German Minister for Foreign Affairs, von Jagow, stated in an interview, that Austria was compelled to go to war because all her interests in the Balkan peninsula met continually with the hostility and ill-will of the Powers of the Entente, so that it had become necessary sooner or later to put an end to such an intolerable state of affairs. Here then the assassination of Sarajevo is relegated to a secondary place, and confession is made that the *ultimatum* to Servia was only a pretext for provoking war.

Is von Jagow's statement true ? I will show you that it is contradicted by facts and by all the official declarations of Austrian statesmen.

Austria and the Balkan wars

First let me state the facts. All that Austria asked after the two Balkan wars, she obtained with the consent and support of all the Powers. Albania was constituted, as she wished, and the sovereign selected by her was imposed upon that country. Montenegro was obliged to give up Scutari, and Servia to renounce having an outlet on the Adriatic ; and the Albanian frontiers towards Greece and Servia were traced according to Austrian desires. These results were all pointed out by Count Berchtold in

his speech to the Delegations on November 20th. 1913, in which, after having enumerated the results obtained, he concluded by saying : *We have carried out the essential part of our programme, and have safeguarded the peace of our Monarchy.*

It has been pretended that the aggrandizement of the Balkan States, after their victorious war against Turkey, had deeply injured Austria's interests and interfered with her programme. This however is a mere assertion, to which I oppose a fact : namely her acceptance of this aggrandizement. In the same speech from which I have just quoted, Count Berchtold called to mind the declarations made in the year 1908, at the time of the withdrawal of the Austrian garrisons from the Sangiaccato. It seems to me opportune to reproduce textually these declarations, to which Count Berchtold only alluded.

After having qualified Austria's march towards the Aegean Sea as a legend, Baron (1) d'Aehrenthal said : *If the Austro-Hungarian troops are withdrawn from the Sangiaccato, it will help to show more clearly how little of selfishness there is in our eastern policy. At the same time it will demonstrate to the Balkan States that Austria is not trying to expand at their expense. And lastly, the withdrawal of our troops will render more harmonious Austro-Hungarian relations with other Powers.*

Count Berchtold, after having repeated that the formula of not hindering the development of the Balkan States had become an axiom for Austria,

(1) Only later did he receive the title of Count.

and that he was disposed to take into account as far as possible (that is with reservations for the economic interests of Austria and Albania) the situation created by the victory of the Balkan States, added : *We were so much the more determined upon the solution of the question, inasmuch as the Monarchy considered that her territorial expansion ended with Bosnia-Herzegovina ; the abandonment of this point of view clearly established by my predecessor, would correspond neither to our interests when rightly understood, nor to the principle of continuity which I have always followed.*

Austria and Italy

I do not wish to multiply quotations, but if one were to read all the speeches of Count d'Aehrenthal and Count Berchtold one would find the same *leit motiv* always repeated, to the point of becoming monotonous : peace, balance of power, territorial disinterestedness. This discreet programme of the balance of power, of territorial disinterestedness and of peace, formed the basis of the relations between Austria and Italy.

The day on which without any warning Austria ruthlessly violated this programme, repudiating her promises and declarations and revealing her secret intrigues, she destroyed the Alliance with Italy. A considerable fuss was made in Austria over the pretended treason of Italy, and over the conversion to a war policy of the men who had carried on the

Alliance. It is easily shown, however, that in Italy there was neither treason nor change in policy. We stood with Austria for peace, for the balance of power in the Adriatic, for the respect of the independence and integrity of the Balkan States, and we remained faithful to her till the day in which she herself, abandoning that programme, forced us to seek the actuation of it elsewhere.

The men, therefore, and I amongst them, who for many years loyally carried on in Italy the Alliance with Austria, serving the cause of their country and of European peace, are not in any sense false to their past policy ; on the contrary they are nobly revendicating it ; because not only is their past policy not in contradiction to their present attitude, but it is instead a most effective justification of the present. It is not Italy who has betrayed her Ally. It is Austria who has betrayed hers, at the same time that she has betrayed the cause of right, of justice and of peace.

Austria and Servia

But has Austria's aggression been in any way justified by Servia's attitude ? Once only has Servia risen against Austria, namely at the time of the annexation of Bosnia-Herzegovina, which provoked deep feeling and not a little agitation in Servia. Austria then, although she had mobilized her army on the Servian frontier, preferred appealing to the Powers, and the result obtained was that which she

had wished. On March 18th. 1909 Servia signed the following declaration, presented to her by England : *Servia acknowledges that she has not been injured in her rights by the* fait accompli *in Bosnia-Herzegovina and she accordingly conforms to the decision of the Powers as regards Art. 25 of the Treaty of Berlin. In accordance with the advice of the Great Powers, Servia engages from this moment to abandon the attitude of protest and opposition which she has assumed with regard to the annexation of last autumn, and furthermore she pledges herself to live on good terms with her neighbour, Austria-Hungary. In conformity with these declarations, and confiding in the peaceable intentions of Austria-Hungary, Servia will reduce her army to the same condition as in the spring of* 1908 *as to its organization, its effective force, and the distribution of troops.*

This intervention of England in the Servian complication is the peremptory confutation of the speech read by Count Tisza in Baron Burian's name a few days ago in Budapest.

Why did Austria, who had herself asked for the intervention of the Powers in her difficulties with the angry Servia of 1908, refuse to discuss with them her dispute with the humble and submissive Servia of 1908 ? There is only one plausible explanation, and it is that in 1908 Austria, although she was the only Power militarily prepared for war, wished for peace, whereas in 1914 she no longer wished for it. Since the year 1908 Austria has been unable to formulate a single serious accusation against Servia.

It has been said that the Treaty of Bucarest was very displeasing to Austria. That is quite possible, especially if, as not without some reason many retain, she was not altogether foreign to Bulgaria's aggression against Servia and Greece, both of whom had accepted arbitration for the settlement of the disputed Macedonian question. But the Power which was the first to declare that the Treaty of Bucarest ought to be respected was, indeed, Germany. Austria has always stated that she only demanded certain guarantees of an economic nature from Servia ; this Count d'Aehrenthal affirmed on October 14th. 1910, when he pronounced himself satisfied with the commercial agreement with Servia.

On November 20th. 1913 Count Berchtold said to the Delegations : *As regards our neighbour, the kingdom of Servia, we consider the initiation of friendly economic negotiations with her to be evidence of our desire for good neighbourly relations. The Servian government has already received communications from us to this effect, and we are now expecting to receive from it, as a proof of its corresponding desire to establish good relations with us, declarations which will assist in promoting negotiations from the point of view of reciprocity in the economic situation.*

And Count Berchtold ended his discourse in terms that he must have completely forgotten shortly afterwards : *To this intent we may express the hope that after the changes that have taken place in the Balkans, a new era will be inaugurated for us in*

our relations with the Balkan States, an era of more intimate and more active economic relations, of mutual confidence and of friendly intercourse.

All the Powers applauded this language which was held but a short time before the war, and indeed I think I may say that all would have been disposed to examine favourably certain guarantees for the freedom of the port and the railway of Salonicco, if Austria had demanded them.

The truth is, however, that Austria has never demanded anything in precise terms. The only economic question that she had negociated with Servia, and this was on the point of being amicably solved, was that of the eastern railways, relative to which Austria had made appeal for French capital. The famous economic proposals were never presented to Servia ; they had not yet been presented on the fateful day of the drawing up of the *ultimatum*.

It is exactly one of those cases in which truth is difficult for belief, since the conduct of Austria clashes in such an extraordinary way with logic and reason. There certainly were in Servia some chauvinists, as there are in every country ; but the government and the Servian nation understood well enough that they were too small and too weak, and that they must of necessity live on good terms with their great and powerful neighbour. One of the most enlightened and cultivated Servian statesmen, my friend Vesnitch, who has succeeded in gaining such sympathy in France, declared in an interview in July 1914, after having deplored in moving terms the crime of Sarajevo, that his grief at this incident

was augmented by the fear that it might hinder the efforts of the Servian government to establish relations of mutual confidence with Austria ; Vesnitch ended his declaration with the following words, which on the eve of the tragic events that were about to take place sounded as a desperate appeal for peace, for equity, for good-will :

Let us beware, he said, of judging the Austria of to-day by the publications of a few over-zealous writers. She counts among her statesmen those who calmly discern the interests of their country. She is ruled—and may she be so for a long time to come—by a great monarch. I cannot therefore deny myself the hope, that this unfortunate cloud between her and my country will pass over without a storm, and that afterwards for the good of all Europe now overshadowed by this crisis, there may come days of good will, of neighbourliness and of calm. This was the language of reason, of moderation, of honesty.

The Austro-Hungarian Ambassador in Paris, meeting Vesnitch, congratulated him on his declaration. I will not allow myself to doubt the good faith of these congratulations. I am not alone in thinking that the Austrian and German Ambassadors in Paris knew little of the stroke that was being prepared in Vienna and in Berlin. But what a tone of cruel and ghastly irony later events have given to these congratulations which preceded the presentation of the Austrian *ultimatum* by only ten days !

Austria and the Powers of the Entente

The grim irony of succeeding events strikes us also in considering another declaration which just preceded the war, the homage from the tribune which the French Secretary for Foreign Affairs, in March 1914, paid to the high wisdom which governed the destinies of Austria-Hungary. But be it well understood, I call this circumstance to your attention in no spirit of criticism, for in reality Austria had been very wise during the whole development of the Balkan crisis ; I only deduce from this another argument against the theory of von Jagow regarding the systematic ill-will of the Powers of the « Entente » towards Austria-Hungary. This ill-will has never existed.

Regarding France, Baron d'Aehrenthal said in 1908 : *France continues to use her influence in smoothing out existing difficulties in the various questions at issue. With the greatest satisfaction we may pay tribute to her efforts, which are deserving of our gratitude, since we are working for the same end as France, the preservation of peace.*

Regarding England, I have already said that it was she who unertook, in conformity with Austria's wishes, to get Servia to sign the declaration of March 18th. 1909, and it is well known to everyone with what peaceable and conciliatory intentions England presided over the conference of London, after the Balkan wars.

On November 20th. 1913, Count Berchtold—but this Baron Burian pretends not to remember—rendered homage to her in the following words : *The foreign policy of England, prosecuted with rigorous objectiveness, has contributed, materially to eliminate the numerous difficulties of the situation, without producing any serious discontent on the part of the interested Powers.*

Regarding Russia, we need not go back to the distant times of the convention of Mürzsteg, which was the recognition on Austria's side of Russia's interests in the Balkans ; without reminding you that in the year 1908, Baron d'Aehrenthal said in connection with the Balkan questions : *It is known at St. Petersburg that we have a perfect knowledge of the interests and wishes of Russia.*

I will quote a more recent declaration made by count Berchtold at the end of the year 1913 : *The evolution of the situation in the Balkans has done away with several causes of misunderstanding between Austria-Hungary and Russia, and it has not only diminished the grounds of disagreement between them, but has also produced, in many ways, a happy harmony of conceptions and of interests which will have an excellent influence on the development of our relations.*

This will be my last word, since I do not wish to crush either Austria or my audience under an avalanche of quotations, which I might multiply to infinity. Those which I have read are more than sufficient to permit us to say to Austria : *Ex ore tuo te judico !*

One of the finest essays of the celebrated English writer Macaulay is that on the regicide of the Convention who has descended to posterity with the name of Anacreon of the guillotine. It closes with this vehement invective : « By attempting to enshrine this Jacobin carrion, Carnot has forced us to gibbet it ; and we venture to say that, from the eminence of infamy on which we have placed it, he will not easily take it down. »

Are the authors and the accomplices of the aggression against Servia sure that future historians, who will reveal and stigmatize their conduct, will not recall the invective of Macaulay ?

Italy's military effort

Must I speak of Italy's military effort ?

The best way of making the French public understand the importance of it is to quote the testimony of Frenchmen who have seen it. Distinguished men who are in almost daily contact with public opinion, Louis Barthou, Stephen Pichon, Gabriel Hanotaux, Maurice Barrès and Joseph Reinach, have been at our front, in our trenches, among our soldiers. They have conversed with our King, with our generals, with our officiers, with our « Tommies », and have summed up their fresh, lively, spontaneous impressions in excellent articles. Louis Barthou has renewed his declarations in this conference in which he has once more shown us, that the eloquence and efficacy of his speech equal the finesse and elegance of his pen.

I will add nothing to what he and his eminent friends have said with so much eloquence and authority. I will limit myself to thanking them publicly in my country's name, for their contribution to Franco-Italian friendship, and like all those who have read their writings or listened to their words, I will associate in one thought the heroes of Verdun and the heroes of the Trentino.

It seems to me that the tremendous conflict in which we have stood shoulder to shoulder, with the anxiety of the first moments of the German and Austrian offensive, to which lately has succeeded the joy of learning that the courage of our armies has arrested our enemies' attack, has bound us more closely together, has united our souls, and has made us feel and understand better the brotherhood of our peoples. Let us keep ever in mind those who are fighting and dying for their country! This will be the surest means of dissipating internal difficulties and of cementing our sacred union.

I must also thank Anatole France, who has kindly presided over our meeting. It is natural that he should be in the first line in all struggles for the cause of justice, which is, and has always been his great passion. On the day of Anatole France's reception at the French Academy (it is melancholy both for him and for me to recall how long ago this was) his colleague Gérard, after having made allusion to the seductive titles of his books, and praised the perfection of his language, drew attention to his pre-eminent characteristic, his spirit of rebellion against all injustice. Anatole France, this charac-

teristic which is the honour and pride of your life, is even more appreciated by us to-day in the present circumstances.

Common effort-Cannon-Ammunition

Mr. President !

Your committee, by making known to the public what has been accomplished by the English, Belgian, French, Italian, Japanese, Russian, and Servian nations, has rendered a worthy and patriotic service. But there is still another effort of which the public has hailed the commencement with joy, and of which it expects the continuation with the cooperation of every one, without exception, and without interruption or hesitation.

This is mutual effort, the collective effort on all fronts at the same time ; the co-ordination and simultaneous action of the allied forces in order that the Central empires may cease to enjoy the advantage of which they have long and cleverly availed themselves, that of fighting on each front in turn and never on all the fronts at the same time.

Certainly the question of cannon and ammunition has an important bearing upon the execution of this military programme. From the first days of the war men of foresight understood that superiority in the number of cannon and means for their renewal, together with the unlimited production of ammunition, would constitute the most important, and perhaps the decisive factor in the war. This

has been understood in France, where one may say with pride, that the formidable problem has been solved. There is absolute need everywhere not only that efforts be doubled, but that they be multiplied a hundred fold, taking as an example the splendid effort of France.

I will not say that this is the price of victory, for in any case, our faith in final victory should be unshaken. Faith however, must not be mystic and contemplative ; it must be supplemented by energetic and continued action, by action that never grows weaker for a single instant, that never stops. For since we must realize that the end of the war can be reached only by means of victory, we should neglect nothing by which we may obtain this as early as possible.

We have always said and shall always repeat, that however long the war may last, we shall continue it to the end ; but it would indeed be culpable thoughtlessness and lack of conscience to say that it is a matter of indifference whether the war be very long or not, almost as if one could be indifferent to the enormous sacrifices of the nations, in blood and in money.

The duration of the war and the possibility of peace

The German Chancellor in his last speech tried to place the responsibility for the continuance of the war upon the Allies, saying that they had contemptuously rejected the first advances for peace.

Let us not enter into a lengthy argument, but simply ask ourselves whether there really was any question of peace established upon a serious basis, namely a peace which would render another war impossible for many years to come. This peace which is the only one that is desirable, is in reality not yet possible. It is not possible even when considered independently of territorial questions, which are indeed bristling with difficulties, above all if one refuses to examine them in the light of the great liberal principles of nationality.

For this reason our peoples, without whose cooperation and support our governments could not continue the war, are determined to carry it on to the end ; as they with their good sense and sure intuition say, it is better to continue the struggle to the end rather than yield to the allurement of an apparent, ephemeral peace, which would not put a definite termination to the war, but would only interrupt it for a few years, leaving those who have provoked it, free to begin it again, when and in whatever manner should seem to them most expedient.

Speaking of the most suitable attitude to be taken by the Allies in the discussion of peace, you, my dear friend Barthou, have already pronounced a formula which I will adopt : *Moderate and just yes, ingenuous no.*

Furthermore, if there are material and moral reparations to be exacted, towns and factories which have been burnt and destroyed and which must be built up again, we should not forget that there is also another edifice which has miserably collapsed

and which must be rebuilt, and that its name is « international law and justice ».

Is it perhaps possible that the old Europe, as it was before the war, the Europe of armed peace, of mad rivalry and the feverish race for armaments, can return again when the great conflict is ended ?

How could we without grave apprehension consider after the war a situation in which the great nations should have to pay the enormous taxes of the past war and at the same time, those not less enormous of preparation for another war in the near future ?

What indeed would be left over for civil and economic progress, for social reforms, for all that which constitutes the march of civilization ?

He would be terribly mistaken who should imagine that the nations would submit to such a state of things ; grave internal situations everywhere would be the consequence, and the passions of the peoples would be violently agitated.

Guglielmo Ferrero, to whom we are indebted for interesting and original views on the war and its consequences, has expressed the hope, in one of his articles, that the revolutionary elements will relinquish the taking of an undue advantage of the situation in which the war will leave us. I think it would be more prudent to give a less fragile foundation to our belief in the future, than this hope.

The post-bellum problems will be more complicated than those of the war, and the tasks of those who govern will be more difficult after than during the war.

In my opinion there is only one way to facilitate

the solution of these problems, and this is to act in such a way that when they present themselves they may be the least grave possible. This consideration should strengthen us in the resolution not to lay down our arms till we have obtained, by means of victory, the only desirable peace, the peace which must contain an element upon which we should ever insist, the element of permanence for a great number of years.

It is not enough to end this war ; we must at all costs avoid the terrible problems that an imperfect peace would cause to arise after the war.

Conclusion

The men who are responsible for this tremendous international conflict, alarmed at the terrible results of their work, wish that they had never unchained it, as they would wish, if they could, to arrest it now. They cannot however ; no one can ; we ourselves, if we wished, could not ; for there is something which is above the will of men, namely the fatal and implacable logic of events. Men can unchain them ; but once unchained it is no longer in their power to stay them. It can be said with reason of the men responsible for this war, what a philosopher of ancient Rome said of all conquerors who, carried away by an insensate love of false grandeur (*insanus amor magnitudinis falsae*), are condemned to be unable to stop till they fall or faint, in the same way that a body launched into space, is not arrested in its course till it falls and breaks in pieces upon the earth !

LETTER

to the Director of the Nuova Antologia

The addresses delivered by me during the war and reproduced by you in your Review have excited keen interest, and have called forth numerous and cordial expressions of approval not only in Italy and among the allied Nations, but also in neutral countries ; I therefore think that it may be useful to the cause of truth and justice, if in acceding to the request of the editors, Treves Brothers, to bring together my addresses in a small volume, I reinforce and complete them with additional facts and considerations.

Post-bellum problems

I will repeat briefly opinions which I have stated clearly in my addresses about the political, economic and social situation which will be created in the various countries by the war, opinions which have called forth some criticism not only from my enemies but also from my friends. My affirmation that it is impossible that at the conclusion of peace the peoples of the different nations resign themselves to bear, together with the very heavy burdens of the past war, those not lesse heavy of preparation for

future wars, has been interpreted as Utopian belief in the possibility of universal peace, and I have been reproached with not having given the prescription for it to the public. Unhappily I do not possess any prescription which can produce such a portentous result, I do not know even that universal peace is possible. I only know, and this I reaffirm with deepest conviction, that the aim of civilization should be to remove as far as possible the calamity of war. Those who choose to call such a conception Utopian, who are unable to discern the new aspects which social questions will assume, who cannot foresee the dangers which threaten, will doubtless consider as more realistic and practical the conception presented by the most eminent of German statesmen, in the new edition of a well known book of his, in which he shows that he is already thinking about the creation of fresh armaments after the conclusion of peace, in preparation for future wars. I will say only one thing to these persons, and that is that those who prepare for future wars, may become, without their being conscious of it, the preparers of future revolutions.

Regarding the other problems, I hold it to be indispensable that the Allies should immediately come to agreements on the ground indicated by my address at Nice ; I also hold that the earliest possible fulfilment of the engagements entered into at the Conference of Paris to remove as far as may be the barriers which hinder the free exchange of products between the markets of the Allies, is essential, and that this is not less important than the mutual agree-

ment as to the territorial and political readjustment of the map of Europe ; as to the other post-bellum problems it seems to me opportune that their discussion be postponed.

In order that the peoples may be able to continue a long war, which imposes such heavy sacrifices on them, it has been necessary that a special mentality should be formed in them, which should combine historical remembrances, re-awakened memories, aspirations, hopes of revendication, sentiments, passions, affections, hatreds, ideals, exalted patriotism and heroism, in short all that aggregation of principles and feelings which create the *mentality of war.* Such a mentality is essential for a prolonged war, and each nation can prolong the war as long as it preserves such a mentality, and no longer. After the war, however, it is evident that in every nation there will arise a political, economic and social situation which it is not easy to foresee, but which will certainly not be that of the war, and therefore the mentality of the peoples can no longer be the same as it has been during the war. Their mentality will bear the traces of patriotism, abnegation, sacrifice, and concord, sentiments which have been nourished during the war ; and this gives us reason to hope that they will come out of this great conflict regenerated and bettered, but in any case theirs will be a different mentality. Now I think that it will be unwise to pretend during the war to promise precise and invariable solutions of post-bellum problems ; for now these problems would of necessity be subordinated to the war, and would be con-

sidered with a war mentality ; whereas when they actually present themselves they should be examined and resolved with the new mentality which will come only when peace has been established.

The enemies' press

But I have said enough upon this subject, and now come to the weak attempt at the confutation of my addresses, which after a long period of hesitation some German and Austrian newspapers have made. First of all I will draw attention to the different estimates of the importance of my addresses. The *Neue Freie Presse* treats me haughtily and says that my speeches *have no importance whatever because Italy counts for little in Europe, while I count for still less.* Instead, the *Kölnische Zeitung* recognizes in the address at the Trocadero a profoundly thought-out and accurately prepared exposition of Italian policy ; and the *Vorvaerts* acknowledges my address at the Sorbonne to be *one of the most complete discussions of political affairs which has been undertaken in the course of the war.* Probably I deserve *ni cet excès d'honneur ni cette indignité.* The trans-Alpine newspapers, however, are agreed on two points. They affirm :

1st. that I have tried to cause my past as a convinced partizan of the Triple Alliance to be forgotten, by loudly proclaiming my adherence to the new policy of war and of union with the Triple Entente ;

2nd. that I, preoccupied above all things by the

accusation of treason brought against Italy, have tried to vindicate her good name and her noble traditions of loyalty, by refuting the accusation of disloyalty to the engagements of the Triple Alliance.

I deny the first charge ; I acknowledge the second to be true.

Italy and the Triple Alliance

The proof of the falsity of the first charge may be found in those very addresses of mine at the Trocadero and at the Sorbonne, apropos of which the German and Austrian press have hurled against me these accusations. Upon me, who on so many occasions have fearlessly encountered an adverse current and challenged unpopularity, no one can ever cast the reproach of having courted popular favour to the cost of dignity and consistency. I have never tried to make any one forget my past policy : rather indeed, in my war addresses, I have discussed it on my own initiative, and have resolutely affirmed that it has been fully justified.

At the Sorbonne I said : *The men therefore, and I amongst them, who for many years loyally carried on in Italy the Alliance with Austria, serving the cause of their country and of European peace, are not in any sense false to their past policy ; on the contrary they are nobly revendicating it.* It seems to me that this may be termed plain speech.

My statements called forth the applause of the select and numerous audience present, who showed

their sincere appreciation of the frankness of my declaration.

Already in my address at the Trocadero, I had clearly demonstrated the sincerity, the continuity and the consistency of Italian foreign policy during the Triple Alliance and after its termination, and the President of the French Chamber, Paul Deschanel, who gave an address at that solemn gathering, substantiated this with the following words : *From the year 1903 the Hon. Tittoni, Secretary for Foreign Affairs, never ceased to repeat in his declarations which were awaited with so much impatience by the Italian parliament and public, that Italy considered the Triple Alliance exclusively as a guarantee of peace, and that she remained in it in full independence and with the purpose of strengthening her friendly relations with England and with France.* Neither was my policy differently understood in Germany and Austria. I could cite numerous quotations from German and Austrian newspapers during the period in which I was at the head of the Foreign Office, but they would be less conclusive as evidence than the judgment given by a German newspaper after I had been Ambassador in Paris for more than two years. Here is what was written in the *Schlesische Zeitung* of July 5th. 1912 : « Tittoni's plan when he was called to office, was to strengthen the Triple Alliance, to win back Austria, but also on the other hand to cultivate relations with France and with England in order to have some insurance against any possible disillusions in the Triple Alliance ; he wished to interest the Powers in his de-

mands regarding Macedonia, and in addition to prevent the convention of Mürzsteg from being prejudicial to Italy ; at the same time he worked to maintain friendly relations with Russia, and the *statu quo* in the Balkans. This is the programme which Tittoni followed during six years of office. Furthermore, in one of his speeches in the year 1908 are to be found these prophetic words : *Iswolski and I have succeeded in improving Italo-Russian relations, and I am convinced that at the opportune moment this will have a great influence upon the course of Italian foreign policy.*

Germany and Austria knew perfectly well that Italy could not approve of an eventual aggression on their part, and that she was not obliged to support it. In May 1909 the *Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung*, the official organ of the German government, published the following prophetic words : « If the Triple Alliance were to be used for an aggressive end, it would work its own enfeeblement and dissolution. » If then, in spite of such a clear conviction, Germany and Austria have wished to attack Servia and provoke the European war, it means that although sadly deceiving themselves, they thought that in themselves alone they were sufficiently strong for the aggression.

The honour of Italy and her noble traditions

I now come to the second charge of the enemies press. In neutral countries an underhand campaign has been carried on with the purpose of making Italy appear disloyal ; and we must acknowledge that this campaign has created doubt and uncertainty among many who did not know the facts, or who knew them only imperfectly or inexactly. Nor have the vehement speeches and appeals vibrating with patriotism, which have succeeded one another in Italy, sufficed to remove such doubts and uncertainties. War literature and war oratory are to be found in abundance, in all the countries engaged in war ; but if public-spirited utterances of this sort are of use in inflaming the national spirit and keeping alight the sacred flame of patriotism within the narrow limits of each belligerent country, it is well to recognize that unfortunately they are harmless to the enemy, and leave the souls of neutral nations cold and indifferent. Besides, such literature and such oratory are not destined to survive the war, nor will history be able to take any account of them; for history flies not on the wings of imagination, but delivers judgments founded on the basis of documents and facts. For this reason, repressing emotion and the impulses of patriotism, I have wished to re-establish the moral position of Italy in history with precise and moderate language, with

cool and careful reasoning, with the help alone of accurately and judiciously sifted evidence.

The numerous and authoritative expressions of approval which have reached me from all countries of the world apropos of my addresses, justify me in affirming that I have succeeded in my intent ; the futile attempts to confute my arguments, made by the enemies' press in its evasive and sophistical replies, have served only to show forth more clearly the soundness of our position.

No, Italy has not violated treaties, nor has she been false to her noble traditions ; she remains as she was, the classic home of right and justice, intolerant of the oppression of the strong against the weak, devoted to the great ideals of liberty and of the independence of nations. Our great teachers have always been interpreters of these lofty principles, and of these generous sentiments. Amongst them I would like to recall two, who have been precursors in all liberal movements of modern international law : Terenzio Mamiani and Pasquale Stanislao Mancini. I like also to recall them as my own revered masters, whose lessons I attended in my youth. As early as the year 1862, Mamiani called attention to the fact that « the territorial and political readjustment of Europe was approaching rational principles based on the two-fold authority of nature and of universal conscience, breaking through the strange barriers within which the poor human flock had been enclosed by the Congress of Vienna. » Hence he affirmed that the complete development, and the free expansion of a nation « reaches

its extreme limit on the day in which there is no distinction between political and national boundaries. » He took up the defence of small nations, and what he stated at that time seems to have been said for the Belgium and Servia of 1914 : « Every autonomous people, however inferior it may be in territory and in riches, and however slight and feeble its defences may be, ought to be able to live in security and with perfect freedom of action by the side of more warlike and more formidable nations. » As regards treaties, he sustained their inviolability, but he declared them to be invalid « when the interests and rights of nations were seriously outraged by them. » How well too, what he has said elsewhere may be applied to Germany and Austria as the provokers of the present war : « The act of accusation pronounced by universal public opinion is the first Nemesis which follows upon injustice committed by the strong ; its revenge is meeted out at all times and in all places. The second Nemesis is the judgment of history which, although it is neither present nor visible, is none the less certain, inexorable, eternal. » And Pasquale Stanislao Mancini in the year 1872, in his lessons of which I still keep the notes, recalled with pride that Italian legislation « above all other legislations, gave a splendid and generous example of international justice » ; and he affirmed that : « the right of a nation to be freely constituted, to keep and to defend its own independence if already enjoyed, or to revendicate its independence if subject to foreign domination, had at length been raised to the dignity of a sacred and

inalienable right ». These are the principles of civilization and of progress which Italy has always defended and by which she has always been inspired. He who does not understand them cannot estimate our conduct at its just value.

Polemics concerning a telegram

As soon as I had finished reading the Austrian *ultimatum* to Servia, I telegraphed to the late Marquis San Giuliano, Secretary for Foreign Affairs, that it constituted a real provocation to war on Austria's part, and that we ought to make a declaration to this effect at Berlin and at Vienna, in order that they might not count upon our cooperation. The publication of my telegram (reproduced by Gabriel Hanotaux in his preface) has induced two Austrian newspapers, the *Fremdenblatt* and the *Reichpost*, to draw the unexpected conclusion, that I am one of those responsible for the war ; they maintain that because I communicated my telegram to French statesmen (the said newspapers have the kindness not to affirm this decisively, but they state it as probable) I therefore in effect urged and encouraged them to go to war.

Now all this is without any foundation. French statesmen had no news whatever of my telegram. It was strictly personal and secret for the Minister, San Giuliano. If I had communicated it to the French government before knowing with certainty the decision of the

Italian Government, I should have failed in my duty to the Government which I was representing. Besides it is easy to prove that the communication of my telegram to the French government is not only not « probable »—to use the term adopted by the Austrian newspapers—but that it must be absolutely excluded as impossible. It is known in fact that I had been reassured by the behaviour of the Austrian government in the first half of July, by that of its official press and of its Ambassador in Paris, as well as by knowledge of the departure on leave of the Russian Ambassador to whom Count Berchtold, while the *ultimatum* was being prepared on the forge of the Ballplatz, had made the most peaceful and reassuring declarations ; and I had been further reassured by the announcement of the imminent departure of Count Berchtold for Ischl, by the departure for Russia of the President of the Republic, Poincaré, and of the President of the Council, Viviani ; the latter on the day of his departure had advised me of the complete tranquility of the international situation. I also had absented myself for a short leave of twenty days, so that the text of the Austrian *ultimatum* to Servia reached me only by wireless on the evening of July 26th. in the Arctic Sea, where I then found myself on board the steamer *Prinz Friedrich Wilhelm* of the Norddeutscher Lloyd. As soon as I had finished reading the *ultimatum*, I answered with the radio-telegram which is reproduced in the preface of Hanotaux ; I was forced to remain in the Arctic Sea without being able to land, and without having any further communication

with *Terra firma* till the day on which another radiotelegram reached the captain announcing, first the declaration of the *Kriegsgefahrzustand,* and then shortly afterwards the declaration of war. Therefore it is not only not « probable », as the Austrian newspapers said, that my telegram may have been communicated to the French government, but if my decisive and categorical denial were not sufficient to exclude such communication, the circumstances to which I have referred would show that it was absolutely impossible.

My telegram had in view an object precisely the opposite of that attributed to me by the Austrian newspapers. Not only had I never thought of inciting France to war, but I earnestly hoped that the declaration which I advised Marquis San Giuliano to make to Berlin and to Vienna *immediately without losing a moment's time,* might inspire milder counsels and obtain the result of preserving peace. I saw directly behind the *ultimatum* to Servia the badly chosen and worse fashioned pretext for war, and I hoped that our categorical refusal to participate in it, communicated in time to Berlin and to Vienna, might be able to check the statesmen in those capitals from proceeding down the declivity upon which they had started. My hope was vain, but my purpose was honest, patriotic, humanitarian, and after having alleged the proof of it, I have the right to expect that it be so considered even by my enemies.

But I will add something more in this regard. When on board the *Prinz Friedrich Wilhelm* the telegram arrived which announced the declaration of

the *Kriegsgefahrzustand*, precursor of the war, the situation was truly dramatic, as there were passengers of nine different nationalities on the ship ; no disagreeable incident however, occurred among them to increase the general feeling of nervousness, of sadness, and of impatient and painful expectation on the return journey, which seemed to me eternal, although we were steaming at full speed. Several passengers of different nationalities enquired of me as to what Italy would do. I maintained the strictest reserve, and only expressed my deep regret over the Austrian *ultimatum*, because I believed that with a little good-will it would have been possible to avoid a war which I foresaw would be long, most bloody, most costly, and would bring ruin in its train upon all. My words produced a great impression on all those who conversed with me, Germans included. One of these latter, after his return to Germany, wrote me a letter in which he told me that the war agitation which he had found in his country had reinvigorated him, for « dans les jours pleins de soucis passés dans la mer polaire, nous étions si agités à cause des menaces de guerre, et Votre Excellence aussi ne pouvait pas cacher son émotion et sa tristesse ». I only mention this in order to show the state of my mind at the end of July 1914, at the moment when war broke out, and to emphasize the fallacy of the insinuations which the enemy have made against me. The enemies' press has applied to my personal case the same inverted logic which it adopts in all in other reasonings. Austria wishes to oppress Servia

and humiliate her ; Servia, submissive in tone, tries to avoid, at least in part, the oppression and humiliation. However, according to them, the guilty party is not Austria but Servia. Russia, not being able to leave Servia to be utterly crushed, asks Austria to discuss the matter ; the other Powers desirous of maintaining peace make conciliating proposals ; Austria rejects them all. However, according to Austria, the guilty party is not herself but the group of Powers who wish to interfere in affairs which do not concern them. Germany wishes to violate Belgian neutrality ; Belgium resists ; England protests. However, according to Germany, it is not her fault, but that of Belgium and of England. Austria violates the letter and the spirit of the Triple Alliance. Italy points out the violation and claims for herself full liberty of action. However, according to Austrian reasoning the traitor is Italy. I confess that in face of such logic, of such a mentality, of such methods, discussion becomes difficult. Let us proceed however, to the end and review the other newspapers.

Declarations of the Minister Sazonow

The *Pester Lloyd* says nothing about my conclusive argument on the responsibilities for the war ; perhaps it is silent because if it had spoken, it could not have helped pronouncing the same judgment on my address at the Sorbonne, which it pronounced in May 1907 on another address of mine, in these textual words : *Tittoni not only makes good his own*

arguments, but he avails himself of the declarations of others with conclusive logic. The Hungarian newspaper notices my address, only to agree with my conclusions. It says : « Tittoni is right, the course of the European war is henceforth independent of the will of single states. Men whom fate has placed in positions of high responsibility have been able to help to unchain the forces which are being measured against each other in this world war, but the ulterior development of events is no longer in their hands, but in the hands of the destiny which decides the success or the decadence of nations. » The *Pester Lloyd* looks upon the *German successes at Verdun, and the Austrian successes in the Trentino,* as favourable omens. It should be remembered however, that the newspaper printed this article under date of June 25th. To-day certainly it would no longer dare to talk of German and Austrian successes at Verdun and in the Trentino, nor could it show ignorance of the offensive on the Somme and of Salonicco, the taking of Gorizia and of the Carso, and the intervention of Roumania on the side of the Entente.

The *Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung* in company with the *Pester Lloyd* finds inconvenience and difficulty in facing documentary demonstration of the responsibility for the war. What does it do then ? It disposes of the subject by a single stroke, declaring my argument useless and superfluous after what Sazonow has said. But it does not seem to me that in the interview given by Sazonow to the *Russkoiè Slovo* there is to be found

anything incriminating, anything that would justify the *Norddeutsche* in saying that Sazonow has *broken down by one rude stroke the spider-web of my reasoning*. Here is the phrase of Sazonow referred to by the *Norddeutsche :* « Bethmann-Hollweg sustains that France and Russia would never have dared to accept the challenge of Germany, had they not been sure of the support of England. But the real political situation was the following, even if the Chancellor does not wish to admit it. In reality France and Russia, notwithstanding their profound love of peace and their sincere efforts to spare bloodshed, had decided at all costs to break the arrogance of Germany, and once for all to make her stop treading on her neighbours' toes. » This phrase may be read over and over again, but there will never be found in it the proposal of aggression on the part of France and Russia denounced by the *Norddeutsche*. Sazonow wished to say, and he said, that even without England's help France and Russia were determined to resist Germany's arrogance and aggression. In short, he only repeated the resolution which had been unanimously formed in Russia in March 1909, when she was forced to bow before Germany's order, and sanction without delay the annexation of Bosnia-Herzegovina, renouncing every guarantee as well as the conference which was about to take place ; indeed it was precisely in those days, that I had renewed proposals for a conference in terms which were equally advantageous for Austria and for the other Powers. Russia in giving way to German arrogance then, vowed that it would be for the last time.

Sazonow has only given expression to this purpose. He therefore has only said what should have been known to everyone before the war. If it was not known to the Austrian and German statesmen who provoked the war, this should not astonish us, for they have shown ignorance on too many subjects.

The crisis of 1909. The action of Italy and England

And here I think that I ought to return again to the crisis of 1909 and dwell upon it more at length, since the analogy between the situation during the first months of 1909 and that of July 1914, is indeed noteworthy, and it will be highly interesting and instructive to put it in a clearer light; besides, in making a new contribution to history, it will be important to demonstrate once more that Italian policy has never changed, and that the policy of to-day finds its explanation and its « raison d'être » in that which was previously followed. I will not repeat my exposition of the question of Bosnia-Herzegovina, for my address to the Italian Chamber of December 4th 1908 gives a clear and complete idea of it. The question was thoroughly discussed in all countries, and therefore I do not think that anything can be said about the period which intervenes between October and December 1908, which is not already known. Instead, with the commencement of 1909, the situation begins to grow misty, and these mists still partially envelop the period

which intervenes between the beginning of January 1909 and the presentation of the German order at St. Petersburg (1). Let us try to throw some light upon this period, and we shall immediately discover that it is certainly not Italy who need fear the light. During the month of January the relations between Austria and Servia had been growing worse. The Powers clearly showed that they did not intend making a *casus belli* of the annexation of Bosnia-Herzegovina, which in no way changed the existing state of affairs and which no one would ever have thought of disputing, since it gave offence only to the *theory* of the inviolability of treaties ; but they had taken no step towards recognition of the annexation itself. Austria armed and her behaviour was quite enigmatical. Germany was ready to support Austria in whatever turn events might take. England and Italy were preoccupied over the uncertainty of the situation, and over the consequent risks as to the preservation of peace. On February 18th. 1909, the Permanent Secretary of the Foreign Office, Sir Charles Hardinge, said to the Italian Chargé d'Affaires, that England was seriously alarmed by the news that Austria was meditating coercive measures against Servia ; and that a conflict between Austria and Servia would disturb the peace of Europe, and would drag the other Powers into war. He proposed therefore to make it understood

(1) When I speak of events anterior to the decree which changed to Petrograd the name of St. Petersburg, I always use the latter form. In the same way I speak of *Baron* d'Aehrenthal in the period anterior to his nomination as Count.

at Vienna, that the Powers were ready and willing to take action at Belgrade, in order that every reason for complaint on Austria's side might be eliminated.

In my position as Secretary for Foreign Affairs I had been troubled for some days with the same preoccupation. I hastened therefore to wire Sir Charles Hardinge's communication to the Italian Ambassador at Berlin, expressing full agreement with it, and adding that I considered as essential, *the cooperation of the Berlin cabinet, without which, diplomatic negotiation with the Austro-Hungarian government would be without effect.* Since, for the avoidance of the threatened conflict with Servia, nothing was needed but the making of a friendly proposal to Austria-Hungary, conceived in such a form and within such limits as not to offend even the most tender susceptibility, *I insisted the more urgently with the German government that it should adhere to the step proposed by England, adding that everything depended on its decision ; and that I was convinced that this was the last card for the prevention of a rupture from which the most serious consequences would be derived for the whole of Europe. The supreme interests of peace were at issue, interests which the German government had appeared on recent occasions to hold as most precious ; and for this reason I was confident that it would complete its work by bringing its weighty influence to bear upon the Austro-Hungarian government, in the service of these interests.*

At the same time I wired to the Italian Chargé d'Affaires in London, expressing my satisfaction at

the initiative taken by England, insisting that the plan should be carried out without delay, and declaring myself ready to cooperate warmly in it. From this it results that Italy and England in face of the danger of an Austrian aggression against Servia, behaved in 1909 in the same way as in 1914, acting with praiseworthy zeal, and in a conciliatory spirit, for the preservation of peace, and doing all that was possible to avoid a war which even then they foresaw would be destined to extend to the whole of Europe.

New attempt for the conference

A period of pourparlers passed without any appreciable result. From all sides came protests of peaceable intentions, from Germany a repetition of her intention to support Austria in every eventuality, from Austria recriminations against Servia. It was then that I thought that is might be possible to find a solution by reviving the idea of the conference which, proposed by England and Russia at the beginning of the crisis of Bosnia-Herzegovina, had not been accepted by Austria. It seemed evident to me that if the question of Bosnia-Herzegovina, were settled between the great Powers, all disturbance in Servia would cease, and hence Austria would have no further reason or pretext for disturbing the peace. Therefore, while all the Powers were working for moderation at Belgrade, I confidentially proposed the holding of the conference ; and since Austria's repugnance to agree to it arose from the indefinite and

unlimited character of the programme, I proposed that the conference should be strictly confined to the points on which all the Powers were agreed, namely : acknowledgment of the treaty between Austria-Hungary and Turkey regarding Bosnia-Herzegovina ; recognition of the independence of Bulgaria ; modification of Art. 29, and abolition of Art. 25 of the Treaty of Berlin. My proposal at first met with hesitation and doubt, but ended by being gradually accepted. It was kept secret for some time, but in the middle of March, when it was made known to the public, it was greeted with satisfaction by the European press. The Italian press was unanimous in praising it, nor did the Austro-Hungarian press show itself less favourable. It would take too long to quote all the newspapers of the double-monarchy. I will select with care from four of the most uncompromising. The *Reichpost* wrote : « To-day (March 17th.) has marked an amelioration due above all to Italy's tactful behaviour. » — The *Vaterland :* « We must place our greatest hopes on the success of the Italian proposal. If such a proposal be perfected and be accepted by Servia, it will be unanimously acknowledged that the merit of having saved and maintained peace is due to the Italian Government. » — The *Zeit :* « The *detente* of the international situation is produced by Italy's proposal. Among the proposals which themselves constitute a peaceful symptom, that of Italy has been received by the Imperial and Royal Foreign Office, which has declared that it will accept it provided that the other Powers shall agree to it. If the other Powers join in Italy's pro-

posal, they will render a great service to the cause of peace. » — The *Pester Lloyd* : « The Hon. Tittoni's proposal should be examined with sympathy. In it the political events of the last few months are grouped with logical method. It touches the kernel of the problem and seems the most practical way of preparing us for the conference. »

In Berlin the proposal met with only one reservation : that of Austria's assent. The official *Lokal Anzeiger* declared that the Italian proposal had produced a very agreeable impression ; and later the *Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung* sang my praises in the following words : « If in time the history of the epoch which is about to be closed be written, it will make evident, on the basis of documents, that the Hon. Tittoni's policy carried out in full agreement with his sovereign, has essentially contributed to the solution of the difficulties which have arisen over the Oriental crisis. The more light that events throw upon matters, the more highly will be appreciated both in Italy and beyond her frontiers, the merit of Italian policy in having contributed to the maintenance of peace. »

The unexpected action of Germany

The satisfaction was general, the nightmare of war was vanishing, Europe was breathing as if freed from some great weight. The crisis of Bosnia-Herzegovina was about to be ended peaceably in the form accepted by an international jury, without leav-

ing in its train any rancour. Why was it that this did not happen? Even now I cannot understand it, and I think that historians will have no little difficulty in clearing up this point. Although violence may be resorted to even when it cannot be justified, useless violence is both unjustifiable and incomprehensible. I have never succeeded in explaining to myself why Germany should have chosen just this moment for a display of arrogance. The crisis of Bosnia-Herzegovina was on the point of being solved in legal form with the agreement of everyone, and in such a way as to leave a tranquil situation, unclouded by those sentiments of resentment which prepare the way for future complications. Germany chose precisely this moment to order Russia, under menace of war, to immediately recognize the annexation, and to renounce the idea of a conference. Her conduct still remains an enigma for me to this day. Germany, giving way to I know not what impulse, set aside a peaceful solution which had already been accepted by Austria, and which would have satisfied everyone, preferring a policy of coercion; and having once succeeded, she has been tempted to resort to this policy again in an analogous situation. It was Germany therefore, which from that time sowed the first seed of the present war.

This was, in my opinion, a very serious error, perhaps the most serious of German policy in a long cycle of years. Germany wounded Russia's *amour propre* without any necessity, and without any reason that one can discover she disturbed the cordiality of her relations with that Power.

I will try to reconstruct events on the basis of documents and of my personal recollections. We were at the end of March. From Berlin I had no hint of the step that Germany proposed taking. Already since March 15th. the Chancellor and the Secretary for Foreign Affairs, although reserving their official answer, had declared themselves personally well-disposed toward the conference in the limits within which I had circumscribed it ; and the French and Austro-Hungarian Ambassadors had pronounced themselves warmly in favour of it. I had only a hint of Germany's new proposals from Vienna on March 16th. but according to Austria's traditional methods, the hint was couched in such vague terms that it gave no idea of what was actually to happen. Mr. Müller, divisional head at the Austrian Foreign Office, went to the Italian Ambassador to tell him that Baron d'Aehrenthal before giving a definite answer to my proposal af a conference, which he had looked upon with much sympathy from the beginning, was obliged to wait till the German government had received an answer to a proposal which it had made to the Russian government. To the enquiry of our Ambassador as to the substance of the German proposal, Mr. Müller gave no definite answer.

On the same date Baron d'Aehrenthal wired to Count Lutzow in similar terms. In the meanwhile the German communication was delivered at St. Petersburg. Russia accepted the demand of Germany and recognized the annexation of Bosnia-Herzegovina ; however, during the whole day of the 24th

nothing was known of this either in London or in Rome.

The morning of March 25th. is still fresh in my memory, when the usher of the Consulta announced the German Ambassador, Count Monts. I had for a moment interrupted the work on which I was busy and was looking out of the window from which one's first glance falls on the giants of the Piazza del Quirinale, of which Goethe has said that neither eyes nor thought suffice to grasp them; beyond, the eye rests on the dome of St. Peters and on Monte Mario which on that morning was radiant with the splendour of an early Roman spring. Before this magnificent panorama which combines the beauties of nature and of art, the interview with Count Monts took place. With serious mine he told me that he had to make a most important communication to me. He was charged by his government to ask me for the immediate recognition of the annexation of Bosnia-Herzegovina. I answered Count Monts with expressions of astonishment at the demand, which appeared to me inopportune and unjustified at a moment when my proposal for settling the question by means of a conference with a programme previously agreed upon, had met with general approval. Count Monts replied that the conference had become useless, now that Russia had already, at Germany's request, agreed to recognize immediately the annexation of Bosnia-Herzegovina. The other Powers could not do otherwise than follow her example. I observed to Count Monts that no communication from St. Petersburg had reached me

regarding this, and that in any case, I had solemnly declared to the Italian Chamber that Italy could accept the annexation of Bosnia-Herzegovina if it were accompanied both by the abolition of Art. 25 of the Treaty of Berlin, and by the modification of Art. 29 ; that of these two conditions only the first had been confirmed, and that therefore I must wait for the confirmation of the second. Count Monts asked me if this were my last word upon the subject, and having received my answer in the affirmative, was about to take leave of me, when the usher announced Count Lutzow, the Austrian Ambassador. I begged Count Monts to remain, and in his presence informed Count Lutzow of our conversation. Count Lutzow hastened to say that it was unthinkable that Baron d'Aehrenthal should refuse the modification of Art. 29 of the Treaty of Berlin, but that in any case he would wire to him at once. With this, our conversation terminated. What happened afterwards is shown by the Austrian Red Book of 1909 *Diplomatische Aktenstücke betreffend Bosnien und die Herzegovina.* The Italian translation of the documents relative to Art. 29 of the Treaty of Berlin was published by me in a Roman newspaper, the *Tribuna,* on September 22nd. 1915. From then it is seen that the modifications of Art. 29 of the Treaty of Berlin were determined by the notes exchanged between me and Baron d'Aehrenthal, and that these notes were duly communicated to the Powers, and were acknowledged by them. Count Lutzow has subsequently tried to minimize the value of these documents, the most important of which

bear his signature ; from them it is seen that Austria modified Art. 29 of the Treaty of Berlin on the demand of Italy. He has maintained that diplomatic documents are only external form and are destitute of value as proof. This is indeed a theory, but Count Lutzow could not hope that it would be accepted either by me or by the public. It has met with no better success than the theory of the *Scraps of paper*. Count Lutzow says that Baron d'Aehrenthal had thought of the abolition of Art. 25 and of the modification of Art. 29 of the Treaty of Berlin as early as the beginning of October 1908. But no one doubts this. Iswolski had the same thought at just that time and communicated it to me ; I too had it, as is seen from a written communication of mine of October 4th. 1908 to Baron d'Aehrenthal. This shows that sometimes *Les beaux esprits se rencontrent*, but it neither does, nor can, lessen the value of subsequent diplomatic acts.

In London a scene was being enacted between Sir Edward Grey and Count Wollf Metternich somewhat similar to that which had taken place at Rome between myself and Count Monts, but it was still more lively and agitated. The press of that period was for a long time taken up with the threatening tone which Sir Edward Grey thought he discerned in the communication of the German Ambassador, and with the words with which it had been presented. I will not linger therefore on the form of the interview, but will speak only of the substance.

Sir Edward Grey's answer was both dignified and just. He said that he would consent to the official

recognition of the annexation of Bosnia-Herzegovina on two conditions : 1st. That Austria-Hungary should accept the mediation of the Powers for settling her conflict with Servia ; 2nd. that the Italian government should inform him that its demands regarding Art. 29 of the Treaty of Berlin, had been satisfied.

Baron d'Aehrenthal hastened to comply with the first condition by a declaration made to the British Ambassador at Vienna on March 27th. The mediation was successfully and completely carried out by the presentation on March 31st. at Vienna of the declaration of Servia which is reported in my address at the Sorbonne.

As regards the second condition, it constituted an act of deference to Italy which I very much appreciated. I presented my thanks to Sir Edward Grey through the Marquis San Giuliano who was then Ambassador in London. I have already stated that the modification of Art. 29 of the Treaty of Berlin had been settled by an exchange of notes between Baron d'Aehrenthal and myself. On April 8th, Baron d'Aehrenthal through our Ambassador at Vienna begged me not to delay in informing the British government of the agreement come to between Austria-Hungary and Italy regarding the modification of Art. 29 of the Treaty of Berlin, as Sir Edward Grey had made his adherence to the abolition of Art. 25 of the same Treaty subordinate to this condition. I gave the requested assurance in London, and on April 13th. Sir Edward Grey gave the desired declaration in writing to the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador.

Thus with close Anglo-Italian cooperation, the Bosnia-Herzegovinan crisis came to an end. All the Powers nourished the hope of having removed the danger for the future as well ; but this hope was vain, for Germany and Austria reserved to themselves the revival of it when it should be expedient for them ; and the world knows in what manner they revived it, with what purpose, with what methods, with what results.

Analogy between the crisis of March 1909 and that of July 1914

Is it true, or not that on July 31st. 1914, Austria-Hungary momentarily repented of what she had done, and made a conciliatory proposal, declaring herself ready to discuss with Russia even the substance of the *ultimatum* to Servia ? If it was so, the similarity between this situation of 1914 and that of 1909 is perfect because, as in 1909 Germany dictated her order to St.Petersburg at the moment when I had almost succeeded in getting all the Powers to accept a conciliatory proposal, so in 1914 it would be seen that she declared war against Russia, just when Austria was growing reasonable and had declared herself disposed to discuss matters.

For me however this is still a doubtful point, over which there hangs a mystery which must be left for history to dispel (1). However this is merely a

(1) Gabriel Hanotaux, in his *Histoire de la Guerre*, says that Berchtold's conciliatory step is possible, indeed probable, and

question of historical curiosity, as Berchtold's conciliatory step would have come too late when the die had already been cast and Germany had declared war against Russia.

In any case it is certain that the more one studies the crisis at the beginning of 1909, the more interesting will be found the comparison with that of July 1914. From every fresh research documents are forthcoming which support the condemnation of Germany's and Austria's conduct in 1914. I will select a few of those which have come under my notice.

In the negotiations with the Powers of the Entente and with Italy, between July 26th. and July 31st. 1914, Germany has affirmed that if Austria had accepted the mediation of the Powers and in the meantime had abstained from attacking Servia, she would have lowered her own dignity and honour, and would have fallen from the rank of a Great Power. But in fact on March 26th. 1909, Baron d'Aehrenthal did actually accept mediation for settling his conflict with Servia, and promised to abstain from attacking her while this mediation was going on. No one in Germany thought that d'Aehrenthal had stained his country's honour or compromised her dignity and prestige, but on the contrary many people both in Germany and Austria,

that in general it is believed. But Pierre Bertrand on the contrary, in his recent book, *L'Autriche a voulu la Grande Guerre*, dedicates a whole chapter to proving that this is only a legend, and that Austria's conciliatory attitude *in extremis* never existed at all.

thought that Austria had vindicated her honour by abstaining from crushing a small nation. My readers will be greatly surprised to learn that amongst those who looked upon the affair in this light was the Archduke Francis Ferdinand himself, the victim of the horrible outrage of Sarajevo.

It has been said that the Archduke Francis Ferdinand was a partizan of war at all costs ; it has been repeated that at the famous Convention of Konopischt he had agreed upon it with the Emperor William II, but no one has been able to furnish any proof of this. On the contrary in March 1909 the *Zeit*, which reflected the ideas of the Archduke's *entourage*, denying the proposals of war attributed to him, expressed itself in these terms : « It is assured on authoritative testimony that the Archduke expressed himself in the sense that nothing should be left undone to avoid a war in which are to be gained neither material nor moral advantages. He has manifested this opinion not only to generals, but also to the foreign office, to which he expressed himself in these words : *The strong should be indulgent towards the weak.*

The strong should be indulgent towards the weak ! This was the admonition which came from beyond the tomb and to which Count Berchtold and Count Tisza would not listen.

The German Press had pronounced itself in the same sense as the *Zeit* a few days before in 1909, and had advised Austria-Hungary not to attack Servia, informing her that if she did so, the responsibility of the war would fall upon her.

The *Hamburger Nachrichten*, expressing the same idea as the Archduke Francis Ferdinand, declared : « To use moderation with a smaller country is a merit for a Great Power. » The *Münchener Neueste Nachrichten* said the same thing : « Is war necessary ? Would it be profitable for the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy ? To conquer Servia would neither be glorious nor profitable for Austria. She can, as Germany hopes she will, find an honourable way out of these difficulties without going to war. » The *Berliner Tageblatt*, approving the proposal for a conference, said : « Let us hope that the German government will use all its influence at Vienna in order that the Austro-Hungarian government may assume a more conciliatory attitude. » Finally the *Frankfurter Zeitung* said : « The decision of peace or of war is in the hands of Austria. As long as war is not desired at Vienna, peace will be preserved. All controversy would be ended, if the ruling men of the Austrian government could be persuaded to negotiate with Servia through the mediation of the Powers. »

If such wise and opportune counsels as these given to Austria-Hungary in 1909 by the *Hamburger Nachrichten*, the *Berliner Tageblatt*, the *Münchener Neueste Nachrichten*, and the *Frankfurter Zeitung*, had been given to her by Germany in 1914, the war would have been avoided. It was, on the contrary, the declaration of Germany that in any case she would march with Austria-Hungary, that urged on the latter in her course of madness and violence. I

have already said that the success of the *démarche* attempted at St.Petersburg in March 1909, encouraged Germany to attempt a similar stroke in July 1914, thinking that it would succeed a second time. A curious incident fully confirms my statement, The German Ambassador at St. Petersburg, Count Pourtalès, instead of the note declaring war, consigned by mistake, another note in which satisfaction was expressed for Russia's acceptance of Germany's demands. A few hours afterwards Count Pourtalès discovered his mistake, and withdrew the pacific note, substituting the warlike one. The pacific note had been prepared before Russia's answer had been given, and it is therefore evident that both in Berlin and at the German embassy in St. Petersburg they were convinced that Russia could not do otherwise than yield. It appears to me that there was the same conviction at Vienna, in that little Sanhedrin of men who provoked the war with the levity and wickedness of urchins who throw a lighted match on a heap of explosives.

There can be found then, no justification, no extenuation for the policy of Germany and Austria-Hungary in July 1914. Their foreign policy in those tragic days is the same as that which was stigmatized by Guizot, in eloquent words which I have had occasion to recall in other circumstances of my public life : « The coarse and ignorant passions of princes and of nations are shown by preference in their foreign policy. Foreign policy is the favourite theatre for brutal or clever violence, for fraud, for thoughtlessness, for improvident egoism and for astonishing credulity. In no other of their func-

tions have governments shown themselves so indifferent to good or evil, so frivolous, so perverse, so chimerical ; in no other field have nations proved themselves so ignorant of their true interests, so ready to be mere instruments and to be easily illuded. » This is a terrible, but just act of accusation and would seem to have been written for the present war.

Vain Austrian semi-official attempt at the confutation of my addresses

It will have been noticed that of the German and Austrian newspapers which mentioned my address at the Sorbonne, at the time of its delivery, not one attempted to cite facts and proofs in confutation of what I asserted and proved by documents as to the responsibility for the war. Such an attempt at confutation however was made after considerable delay on July 16th. last by the *Neue Freie Presse*. To my severe but moderate language the Viennese newspaper opposed an avalanche of insults (1). If I were to answer them, I should have to descend to a lower plane than that on which I have placed the question of the responsibility for the war. The serenity and impartiality of history now extends

(1) Here are the choicest extracts from the enemies' prose : « Tittoni's address is a tissue of lies. Tittoni lies with a brazen face. Tittoni is convicted of falsehood. Tittoni's assertion is cynically opposed to the truth, etc. etc. » The best of it is that as my assertions are founded on the declarations of d'Aehrenthal and Berchtold, it is they who are hit by the accusations of falsehood.

over it, and I have never deviated from that serenity and impartiality in my arguments and in my judgments. Moreover the Hon. Salandra in his address at the Campidoglio has fittingly answered once and for ever and for all Italians, all present and future abuse from our enemies (1).

To my accurate, conclusive, documentary evidence the *Neue Freie Presse* opposes meanderings which are not easy to follow. I will sum up however those points in which the attempt at confutation of my arguments assumes at least the appearance of precision.

At the beginning of the article of the Viennese newspaper are to be found, near to each other, the two following sentences : « Tittoni says that Austria had continual recurrence to mobilization. This is false. » And soon after one reads: « Besides, the continual mobilizations of Austria-Hungary are a proof that she acted thus as a measure of defence, feeling herself constantly threatened by Russo-Servian intrigues. » What are we to think then ? Did Austria mobilize or not ? What an arduous task it is to endeavour to make the *Neue Freie Presse* agree with itself ! The truth is that Austria mobilized at every rustling of the leaves, and that her mobilization jeopardized the peace of Europe. Faithful to my system of proving what I assert, and of citing as evidence only the statements of our adversaries themselves, whom it is not possible to accuse of partiality or of falsification in our interest, I will recall

(1) I could not, even if I would, imitate their language. The atavistic return to barbarism is more difficult for us who are more than twenty centuries distant from it.

what the *Hamburger Nachrichten* published on March 17th. 1909: « The armaments and the expenses for the mobilization of Austria-Hungary have reached such a height that she can hardly help going to war ! »

Let us go on. It is affirmed in continuation that: « Marquis San Giuliano in the summer of 1914 admitted to the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador at Rome, that the proofs contained in the memorandum of the Austro-Hungarian government had given him much food for thought ; and the General Secretary at the Foreign Office, profoundly impressed by the appendices of the note to Servia, expressly recognized the defensive character of the Austro-Hungarian action, and asked and obtained from Marquis San Giuliano the authorization to tell Merey, that he considered the refusal of the Italian government to fulfil its duties as an ally, unjustified and mistaken. »

Marquis San Giuliano's attitude cannot have been that which the Ambassador Merey attributes to him in the documents published in the Austrian Red Book. The Austro-Hungarian ambassador has related his conversation with our Secretary for Foreign Affairs with the inexactness with which his colleague in London, Count Mensdorf, has related his conversation with Sir Edward Grey. The attitude of Marquis San Giuliano is seen from the telegram which he sent to Italian Ambassadors abroad, in which it is stated that the Ambassador Merey, in presenting to him the text of the *ultimatum* to Servia, asked for neither support nor advice, and therefore he had no occasion to express any opinion. Besides, Marquis

San Giuliano could not have placed himself in contradiction to the President of the Council, Salandra, who on the same day declared to the German Ambassador, Flotow, that Italy was under no obligation to intervene if, because of the aggression of Austria, Germany should find herself at war with Russia—a declaration moreover, that San Giuliano himself repeated to Baron Flotow after the German order had reached St. Petersburg. As regards the distinguished General Secretary of our Foreign Office, I have had occasion several times to discuss the matter with him. I will not dwell upon the last part of the declaration attributed to him. It is so very ridiculous, and in such contradiction to all the diplomatic documents, that his denial seems superfluous. How can any one suppose that Marquis San Giuliano, while before our former Allies he was strenuously sustaining the thesis of our neutrality, as conforming to the letter and to the spirit of the Alliance, should authorize the General Secretary to say precisely the opposite? Such fantastic inventions carry us from the field of reality into that of romance. As regards the first part, Comm. De Martino has always told me that he observed ironically to Merey that it was strange that little Servia could, as the *ultimatum* asserted, threaten nothing less than the integrity of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy; and this ironical sentence was transformed by Merey into an assertion favourable to his own thesis.

In spite of the publication of the Green Book and the exhaustive addresses of the two ministers, Salandra and Sonnino, the *Neue Freie Presse* returns to

the subject of the negotiations for territorial concessions to Italy. It seems to me useless to insist on this point, after the declarations made by Count Tisza to the Hungarian Parliament on August 23rd. and of which the Deputy Rakowski deplored, in the interest of Austria-Hungary, that the censor had allowed the publication. Count Tisza expressed his satisfaction that these negotiations caused Italy to lose time and delayed her intervention till after the victory of Göritz, so that Austria could take troops away from the Servian frontier and bring together sufficient forces to parry the Italian attack. Count Tisza's words remind me of the tactics followed by Metternich against Napoleon in 1813. Metternich conceived the plan of making offers to France of territorial readjustment, which he had no intention of maintaining, and which he well knew that Napoleon could not accept ; he continually varied these offers, and proceeded to discuss them at length, in order to gain as much time as possible to enable Austria to complete her armaments ; once these were ready he interrupted the negotiations with France, and together with Prussia (secretly cognizant of Metternich's plan and approving it) joined Russia with the purpose of crushing France with their united forces. The instructions given to the negotiators read as follows : « Proceed with skilfulness and circumspection, feign fidelity to France, keep her full confidence, do not decisively refuse any fresh demand, and feed her with vain hopes » (1). Met-

(1) See Albert Sorel : *Les Alliés et la Paix en 1813.* (*Revue des Deux Mondes*, Juillet-Août 1906).

ternich's success was complete and had its epilogue at Fontainebleau. Count Tisza and Count Berchtold have been less fortunate than Metternich. The *Neue Freie Presse* entirely rejects the assassination of Sarajevo as a reason for the *ultimatum* to Servia, and fully accepts von Jagow's theory that this was only a pretext to provoke the Powers of the Entente to war, as they were rendering life intolerable to Austria. I record this precious confession, which abandons the assassination of Sarajevo as the reason for the war, thereby giving the lie to the *ultimatum* (1).

(1) Already M. Jean Herbette in the *Echo de Paris* of July 25 th. 1916, after having noted that the *Neue Freie Presse* in this article contradicted the Emperor William II. who in his telegram to the Czar reminded the latter that as a sovereign he should be interested in the punishment of the accomplices of the assassination of Sarajevo, added : « Tittoni, the Italian Ambassador in Paris, has skilfully provoked Austrian testimony which destroys this legend, just as German evidence did away with the legend of French aeroplanes over Nüremberg. In the address which Tittoni delivered at the Sorbonne on July 22nd. last, he passed judgment upon Austrian policy. » The *Neue Freie Presse* has attempted to refute his argument in a long semi-official defence, in the course of which it lets drop the following words : « No responsible statesman of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy has ever pointed to the horrible crime of Sarajevo as the cause of the war against Servia. » A never to be forgotten confession that must be recorded in the pages of history! If then the rupture of July 25 th. 1914, was not effected precipitously in a moment of indignation, why were relations broken off after Servia had humbled herself and Austria's victory was complete? The reason is that it was not a diplomatic, but a military victory that was wanted. War was wished for, not only at Vienna, as that would not have been sufficient, but it was desired also at Berlin.

Therefore von Jagow's thesis regarding the systematic hostility of the Powers of the Entente towards Austria was accepted.

But this thesis was most effectively confuted in my address at the Sorbonne, and till now nothing has been produced to rebut my confutation.

The *Neue Freie Presse* appeals to my evidence regarding the difficulties that were found in maintaining the concord of the Powers in the programme of disinterestedness in the Balkans. It is quite true that there were difficulties, and serious ones, but they were overcome, and Italy, loyally supporting Austria-Hungary, effectively contributed to this. But Austria-Hungary declared war after these difficulties had been overcome, and therefore not because of them ; and while difficulties had arisen solely with regard to Albania and Montenegro, Austria declared war... against Servia. There is therefore no excuse, no extenuating circumstances for the great criminal.

The *Neue Freie Presse* affirms that Austria, in the beginning of 1913, made concrete proposals to Servia regarding concessions of an economic nature, which were to have been the basis of mutual friendly relations, and says that I must have received notice of them. I certainly never received such notice ! *Never !* Austria proposed nothing, and I knew nothing. I have here all my correspondence on this subject with Marquis San Giuliano, and from this it results that Count Berchtold, after having expressed his intention of asking Servia for economic concessions, never concreted them ; while I, in several telegrams to Marquis San Giuliano, expressed

regrets over this omission which gave an aspect of dangerous uncertainty to the relations between Austria and Servia.

The *Neue Freie Presse* can produce nothing in face of the declarations of Berchtold, who speaking to the Delegations in 1913, paid high tribute to the policy of England and Russia towards Austria ; and the newspaper limits itself to objecting to what I stated regarding the correctness of French policy towards Austria, asserting that Count d'Aehrenthal's evidence, which I invoked, is too old, and that France has changed since then, and has become bellicose. Very well I will try the case: The *Neue Freie Presse* of 1914, versus the *Neue Freie Presse* of 1916. In the number of March 12th. 1914 of the said newspaper, attention is drawn to the praise given by the French Minister, Doumergue, to the Emperor Francis-Joseph and to Austrian policy, and this is contrasted with the coldness of Count Berchtold's expressions towards France, though Berchtold had spoken with warmth of the Austro-Russian friendship ; and then the statement is made : « France deserved warmer expressions. A country whose interests do not clash with ours in any part of the world should have been treated with the utmost consideration. »

After having declared that the unfortunate antagonism between France and Germany had been extended in French public opinion also to Austria, and that for this reason « the courteous words of the minister Doumergue should have been received with gratitude », the newspaper concluded with words which it is a real pity should have been completely forgotten only four months afterwards : « With the

exception of a little group of those who want war at any cost, no one in the Austro-Hungarian monarchy intends to provoke a world conflagration. » Unhappily only four months afterwards the little group of Austro-Hungarians who desired war at any cost became a legion.

Conclusion

The prolongation of this cruel war through its sanguinary phases gives a tone of actuality to a reflection of Lamartine : « After the first cannon shot a good citizen no longer enquires why he is fighting, or with whom he is fighting. When one has not been able to enlighten one's country, one must march with her even to ruin ! » In Germany and Austria-Hungary political men who attempt explanations, scientists who launch manifestoes, parties which agitate, journalists who dispute, did not know how to prevent war, or they would not or could not prevent it. Of what use is it to ask them for a confession of wrong or an expression of regret ? Tardy repentance has never remade history. These therefore can do nothing, but what they are doing : « Marching with their country towards ruin. »

Ruin for them, resurrection for the others !

The Powers which proclaimed that they undertook this war on behalf of liberty and justice, have assumed before the civilized world the pledge of bringing it to a successful issue. All the nationalities which have known the anguish of foreign oppression

are awaiting the hour of their freedom, and they have heard its first hour strike.

Among the many observations made in my addresses late events have given a singular importance to one in the address delivered at the Trocadero : « Austria-Hungary showed great want of foresight. She did not consider that by imprudently dragging Europe into a fearful conflagration, causing thereby endless ruin and the shedding of the blood of a whole generation, she necessarily raised on all sides the great problem of oppressed nationalities, which the universal desire for the preservation of peace had deliberately caused to be put on one side for so many years. She failed to understand that this problem, when once raised, allowed of but one, fatal, inevitable solution : Redemption ! »

Paris, September 5th. 1916.

Tommaso Tittoni.

APPENDIX

Preface to the French edition,
by G. Hanotaux,
Former Minister for Foreign Affairs,
Member of the Academy.

The Hon. Tittoni, Deputy, Prefect, Member of the Senate, Minister, Ambassador, is a man who has politics at his finger-tips ; he has knowledge and savoir-faire, ability and tact ; he is an intellectual humanist and a man of letters ; he is an excellent representative of the present Italian generation, the generation which, having received a free and united Italy from its predecessors, is determined to leave a « greater Italy » to future generations. The elder men of this generation were the statesmen whom I have known and loved : Visconti-Venosta, Marquis di Rudini, Ressman, Tornielli. I have found that they all have these traits in common : loyalty, common sense, an instinctive dislike of ostentation in word and deed.

Tittoni, with a thorough knowledge of his country's affairs as a parliamentarian and an administrator, was made Secretary for Foreign Affairs and Ambassador to Paris, and thus he was brought into contact with European affairs, And he has become a finished statesman.

We knew him before the crisis, a quick-sighted diplomat, rather reserved, weighing his words, mingling in our life with modest kindliness, observing Parisian society with the keen and quick glance of a man who is never taken by surprise. There was nothing of the affected diplomat about him. His intellectual keenness was tempered with a charming simplicity. No posing, no stiffness... Men of real worth can afford to allow this easy familiarity which smilingly enforces respect. This is the man who had the mission of making Italy known to France at the time when international affairs were growing unmistakably complicated.

I have no doubt that Ambassador Tittoni, once accustomed to our ways, understood the real strength which underlies our apparent easy-going indecision. As a liberal he was not astonished at liberal customs. He saw clearly that the French Republic has vigorous political traditions, solid foundations, great resources, and enviable military power, all of which adds to the total worth of French civilization.

A shrewd judge of conditions, he certainly formed a just estimate of the influence of French policy in Europe and of the balance of European power. For we found him a diplomat of clear vision and of quick decision, when the present crisis came upon us.

The mass of the people suspected nothing; they were carrying on their busy and heedless life when those on the look-out saw the storm approaching. The Italians especially, early haul-

ed in sail. They knew that in case of a storm, their country would be tossed hither and thither on cross currents.

Italy belonged to the Triple Alliance; her position on that account was particularly dangerous.

She knew that Prussia, in order to eliminate the rivalry of Austria from German territory, was driving the latter Power towards the Balkans and the Adriatic ; but, if such a policy were to prevail, Italy would be the dupe. She had contracted the alliance in order to preserve the European equilibrium and peace ; what would she do if she were brought face to face with unstable European equilibrium and war ?

Happily Italian foresight had taken precautions.

Article 7 of the Triple Alliance contemplated the possibility of an Austrian intervention in the Balkans. In the main, the treaty was made to guard against complications in that quarter. Here is the article, the force and precision of which is admirable : « Austria-Hungary and Italy, aiming exclusively at the maintenance of the *statu quo* in the East, bind themselves to employ their influence to prevent every territorial change prejudicial to either of the contracting Powers.

« These Powers shall give each other reciprocally all explanations requisite to the elucidation of their respective intentions, as well as of those of other Powers. If however, in the course of events, the maintenance of the *statu*

quo in the territory of the Balkans and on the Ottoman coasts and islands in the Adriatic Sea and in the Ægean becomes impossible, and if, either in consequence of the procedure of a third Power or of other causes, Austria or Italy be constrained to change the *statu quo* by a temporary or lasting occupation, this occupation shall take place only after previous agreement between the two Powers on the basis of the principle of a reciprocal arrangement for all the advantages, territorial or other, which one of them may secure outside the *statu quo*, and in such a way as to satisfy all the legitimate claims of both parties. »

From the hour that Austria's ambitions came into play and endangered the territorial *statu quo* in the Balkans, by crushing Servia without any explanations or previous arrangement with Italy, only one choice was left to the latter Power : to sacrifice either her interests or the Alliance.

To break the Alliance, was to renounce a policy which had been followed for many years, and which had recently been renewed, a policy which apparently presented all the advantages of security and outward show, which was easy because it was becoming traditional, which avoided serious risks, and which in addition, because of all this, had lulled Italy into a sense of security, and had left her disarmed.

On the other side there was honour and the future, but risk.

For the situation was such that, to take a step

backward meant a complete change of policy. In the crisis that was about to divide Europe a Great Power was obliged to take some decision under pain of being excluded from the final settlement, and of having both sides as enemies.

Italy had been nonplussed when, a year and a half before the war, Austria-Hungary apropos of the Scutari incident had threatened Montenegro ; this was Austro-Hungarian hegemony casting its shadow over the Balkans.

There was great agitation at the Consulta. The Ambassadors were questioned. Ready as he was, Tittoni did not hesitate. In answer to the question put to him, he gave a reply which is a masterpiece of perspicacity and resolution.

Between the Alliance and Italy's interests, the Ambassador advised the sacrifice of the Alliance... Remember that the other European Powers had not yet declared themselves, and that Italy was alone then !

Here is the text of that memorable telegram made public by the Ambassador himself in his address delivered at the Trocadero on June 24th. 1915.

The sophistries to which the Austro-Hungarian and German Ambassadors have recourse by keeping merely to the letter of Article 7 of the Treaty of Alliance are of no value whatever. The spirit of this article is clear ; furthermore any disturbance of Italo-Austrian equilibrium would affect not only Article 7 but the whole Treaty of Alliance. The day on which Austria should pretend to disturb in any way or measure the equi-

librium of the Adriatic, *the Triple Alliance would cease to exist.*

This was written in April 1913.From this date the crisis was opened. From this date Italy, following the advice given by her Ambassador, practically ceased to belong to the Triple Alliance.

Here is a strong will which brings forth action !

Events followed each other according to the logic of destiny.

The man who had given the decisive blow at the critical moment, never once went astray. He knew that the storm would break in the direction of Servia. He asserted it, he repeated it, and he kept every one on the « qui vive ». And when a tragic incident, the murder of the Archduke Francis Ferdinand, furnished Austria with the pretext which she was seeking, he gave his country the supreme advice : He telegraphed on July 26th. 1914, these brief words, weighty with meaning and responsibility : *My opinion is that out of loyalty we should immediately make it known at Berlin that the ultimatum presented at Belgrade, without our knowledge, and without being preceded by diplomatic steps, constitutes a real provocation to war on the part of Austria-Hungary. Consequently, the convention of the Triple Alliance would no longer be applicable even if Russia should take part in the war (that is to say in the case of a general war). We should make this declaration at once.*

It cannot be said of this diplomat that he dissembles. What pleasure it gives one to see fine characters like this at work !

The words of the Ambassador were inspired only with the wish to defend Italy's dignity and interests, in accordance with the sentiments of the King and government ; they were frank and full of wisdom also for the other members of the Triple Alliance, if these latter had only been able to understand them, and to listen to them ; they bore the germ of Italy's neutrality, of her subsequent participation in the war on the side of the Powers of the Entente, and finally of Italy's declaration of war against Germany.

For this is what the penetration of Italian statesmen could not help seeing ; Austro-Hungarian ambitions are only the consequence of German ambitions. It is because Prussia wished to be alone in Germany that she drove Austria back against the Slavs ; it is Germany who laid the snare in which Italy would have been taken had she not been able to break it ; it is German ambition that desires Trieste. Austria is only an instrument.

Pan-Germanism has not been credited with its full part. German hegemony had Balkan and Mediterranean ambitions, as she had world-wide ambitions.

There is no longer any possibility of a compromise with Germany. She must submit to the general will of Europe, as she has not chosen to be a « good European ». Bismark's

system is overthrown ; and now the proud militarism of William II. must be destroyed, extirpated at its roots.

I am sure that when the hour comes, Tittoni will be a resolute gardener in the garden of victory.

..... *maturae vinitor uvae.*

Thus a short and brief phase of a man's life will have seen the gravest problems present themselves, and find a solution. There is not one line of the addresses published in this volume that does not deserve attention and reflection.

It is a real intellectual pleasure for me to present it to the French public. The Hon. Tittoni in asking me to do this, has done me a high honour, and has given me a proof of friendship of which I know the full value.

Paris, September 6th. 1916.

G. Hanotaux.

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